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CERTIFIED QUESTION 
Under Tenth Circuit decisions at the time Gerardo Thomas Garza filed his 
complaint, approximately two years remained in limitations period. A Supreme , 
Court decision soon after filing, however, overturned those decisions and rendered 
his complaint approximately ten months late. Under Utah law, does an 
intervening change in controlling law merit equitable tolling under these 
circumstances? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Mr. Garza seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from Officer Burnett, an 
Ogden City Police Officer, for an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of 
Mr. Garza's Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Garza's claim arises from Officer 
Burnett's involvement in a warrantless search of Mr. Garza's hotel room on April 
19, 2002. While conducting the warrantless search, the officers saw that Mr. Garza 
possessed a firearm. After Mr. Garza was taken into custody, the officers found 
some methamphetamine. Mr. Garza was charged and convicted of possession of 
methamphetamine and possession of a firearm by a felon in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. He served 31 months in prison before the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed his conviction based 
on the illegal February 2, 2005 search. Mr. Garza's appeal addresses whether his 
§ 1983 claims are barred by Utah's four-year statute of limitations. 
15132496.4 1 
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II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On October 25, 2006, Mr. Garza filed his original pro se complaint alleging 
claims under § 1983 against the United States for violations of his Fourth and 
Eighth Amendment rights. (Appellant's Supp. Appx. at 1-18.) On April 5, 2007, 
Mr. Garza filed a separate pro se complaint, alleging a § 1983 claim against 
Officer Burnett based on the violation of Mr. Garza's Fourth Amendment rights.1 
(Appx. at 1-10.) On August 28, 2008, the federal district court dismissed Mr. 
Garza's claim against the United States on sovereign immunity grounds. 
(Appellant's Supp. Appx. at 19-21.) On February 11, 2009, the district court 
granted Mr. Garza's motion for appointment of counsel and instructed appointed 
counsel to review Mr. Garza's pending cases "to determine whether they allege 
any viable claims and, if so, whether they can be consolidated into a single case." 
(Appellant's Supp. Appx. at 25.) On May 12, 2009, Mr. Garza's appointed 
counsel filed a motion to consolidate and a proposed amended complaint. 
(Appellant's Supp. Appx. 27-41.) 
On June 29, 2009, the court entered an order consolidating the cases and 
granting Mr. Garza leave to amend his complaint. (Appellant's Supp. Appx. at 
42-45.) Mr. Garza filed an amended complaint on June 30, 2009, alleging § 1983 
1
 Because Mr. Garza's complaint was received by the court on February 16, 2007, 
along with his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Mr. Garza's complaint is 
treated as filed on February 16, 2007. See Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d 1217, 1219 
n.l (10th Cir. 2012). 
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claims against Officer Barnett for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and 
various John Does for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and for violation 
of the Unnecessary Rigor clause of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9. (Appx. at 
69-77.) Officer Burnett moved for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. 
Garza's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (Appx. at 14-45.) The 
district court agreed and granted Officer Burnett's motion on March 23, 2010. 
(Appx. at 134-56.) 
In its memorandum decision, the district court explained that under the law 
as it existed when Mr. Garza was convicted, a § 1983 claim was not cognizable if 
it would render invalid a plaintiffs conviction or sentence. Heck v. Humphrey, 
512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Appx. at 138.) The Tenth Circuit had construed Heck to 
apply to both extant and anticipated future convictions, so that "§ 1983 claims that 
might impugn an anticipated future conviction were deemed not to accrue so long 
as the potential for a judgment in the pending criminal prosecution continued to 
exist." (Appx. at 140.) Therefore, under the Heck case, which was governing 
precedent in this Circuit when Garza was convicted, the statute of limitations was 
not running on his § 1983 claims until his conviction was overturned. 
However, in the February 20, 2007 decision of Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 
384 (2007), the United States Supreme Court rejected this rule and held that 
Heck's deferred accrual applies only when success in a § 1983 action would 
impugn an extant conviction. (Appx. at 141.) The district court in Mr. Garza's 
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case applied Wallace to the facts and concluded that Mr. Garza's § 1983 search 
and seizure claim accrued on the date of the challenged search, April 19, 2002. 
(Appx. at 141.) Because Mr. Garza had no outstanding conviction at that time, the 
statute of limitations began to accrue in April of 2002, and was not tolled under 
federal law by his later conviction. Therefore, his claim was not timely filed under 
the applicable statute of limitations. (Appx. at 141.) In effect, Mr. Garza's suit, 
timely when filed, was rendered untimely retroactively by Wallace. 
The district court further determined that Utah's doctrine of equitable 
tolling did not apply because Mr. Garza had "not shown that he was unable to 
assert his rights within the limitations period." (Appx. at 142.) The district court 
distinguished cases relied upon by Mr. Garza in which courts had applied 
equitable tolling to mitigate the effects brought about by Wallace's retrenchment. 
The district court cited three considerations. First, none of the cases were based on 
Utah law and most relied upon "state equitable tolling laws which are substantially 
broader, and hence more lenient, than Utah's." (Appx. at 143.) Second, Utah 
already provides "a significantly longer limitations period for § 1983 claims than 
those states in which equitable tolling has been found warranted" and applying 
equitable tolling "would likely cause substantial prejudice to potential 
defendants." (Appx. at 143-44.) Third, "none of the cases granting equitable 
tolling . . . involved such an extreme delay as that found here." (Appx. at 144.) 
The district court noted that Mr. Garza "waited over nineteen months from the 
15132496.4 4 
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time his conviction was overturned before filing the present suit." (Id.) The district 
court concluded that Mr. Garza "inexcusably and unreasonably slept on his rights, 
making him ineligible for equitable tolling under Utah law." (Appx. at 146 
(quotation and alteration omitted).) The district court entered judgment in favor of 
Officer Burnett on March 25, 2010. (Appx. at 225.) 
Mr. Garza appealed the district court's entry of judgment in favor of Officer 
Burnett to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that 
the intervening change in the law brought about by Wallace entitled him to ' 
equitable tolling under Utah law. Mr. Garza also moved to certify the equitable 
tolling question to the Utah Supreme Court. On March 8, 2012, the Tenth Circuit 
issued its decision in which it agreed with Mr. Garza that Wallace rendered 
untimely his previously timely complaint. The court then granted Mr. Garza's 
motion to certify the question of Utah equitable tolling law. On April 13, 2012, the 
Utah Supreme Court accepted the certified question. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 19, 2002, Officer Burnett along with another Ogden City Police 
officer, Officer McGuire, performed a "knock and talk" investigation of room 133 
at a Motel 6 in Ogden, Utah. (Appx. at 70.) Ms. Rosa Reyes Ambris answered the 
door and allowed the officers to enter. (Id.) As they entered, the officers heard the 
bathroom door shut and they asked Ms. Ambris who was in the bathroom. (Id.) 
Ms. Ambris answered that Mr. Garza, her boyfriend, was inside the bathroom. 
15132496.4 5 
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(Id.) Without asking permission and lacking probable cause to search the 
bathroom, Officer Burnett walked to the door of the bathroom and pushed it open. 
(Id. at 71.) When Officers Burnett and McGuire told Mr. Garza to show his hands, 
they saw Mr. Garza was holding a firearm and placed him under arrest. (Id.) When 
taken into custody, the officers found that Mr. Garza was in possession of 
methamphetamine. (Id.) 
Mr. Garza was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possession of methamphetamine in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 844. (Appx. at 56, 71.) Mr. Garza entered a conditional plea, reserving 
his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (Appx. at 
56.) Mr. Garza was sentenced to thirty-seven months imprisonment and three 
years supervised release. (Id.) 
On February 2, 2005, the Tenth Circuit overturned Mr. Garza's conviction, 
holding that the officers' search of the bathroom was unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Garza, No. 04-4046, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 
1659, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2005) (unpublished).2 (See also Appx. at 56-61.) By 
the time his conviction was overturned, Mr. Garza had served a total of thirty-one 
months in prison. (Appx. at 71.) 
Mr. Garza filed his original pro se complaint on October 25, 2006, alleging, 
among other things, violation of his Fourth Amendment rights arising out of 
2
 Copies of all unpublished cases are attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
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' ( 
Officer Burnett's unreasonable search on the date of Mr. Garza's arrest, April 19, 
2002. (Appellant's Supp. Appx. at 1-18.) On February 16, 2007, Mr. Garza filed 
suit in federal court naming Officer Burnett under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on the 
unconstitutional search of the hotel bathroom. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Utah's principles of equitable tolling, the limitations period is tolled 
when a case presents "exceptional circumstances" and the application of the 
i 
statute of limitations would be irrational or unjust. Here, at the time Mr. Garza 
filed his action, it was timely. However, it became untimely solely by reason of 
the intervening change in the law brought about by the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). This unforeseeable intervening 
event gives rise to "exceptional circumstances" under Utah law and makes 
application of the four-year limitations period irrational and unjust. 
Absent a tolling of the limitations period, Mr. Garza will lose his claims 
entirely, claims that were timely when filed. In contrast, tolling the limitations 
period will not prejudice Officer Burnett in the least because at the time the claims 
were brought, Mr. Garza's claims were timely and Officer Burnett could not have 
relied on the passage of time to extinguish them. The balancing test which is the 
crux of Utah's principles of equitable tolling favors a finding of exceptional 
circumstances sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. 
The limitations period that under Wallace had begun to run on the date of 
15132496.4 7 
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the unlawful search (April 19,2002) should therefore be equitably tolled until the 
date on which Mr. Garza's conviction was overturned (February 2, 2005). 
Therefore, Mr. Garza's claims against Officer Burnett were timely. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER UTAH LAW, AN INTERVENING CHANGE IN THE LAW 
MERITS EQUITABLE TOLLING UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF MR. GARZA'S CASE. 
In Utah, "the principle of equitable tolling has been developed almost 
exclusively through the application of the discovery rule." Beaver County v. 
Property Tax Div., 2006 UT 6, If 30, 128 P.3d 1187 (quotation and alteration 
omitted). Utah courts apply the equitable discovery rule when (1) "a plaintiff does 
not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment 
or misleading conduct" or (2) "the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action." 
Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87,123, 223 P.3d 1128 (quotations omitted; 
emphasis added). Utah courts have held that before either test can be satisfied, 
"the plaintiff must make an initial showing that he did not know nor should have 
reasonably known the facts underlying the cause of action in time to reasonably 
comply with the limitations period." Id. 
In situations where the plaintiff could not make a threshold showing that he 
did not know nor should have reasonably known the facts underlying his cause of 
15132496.4 R 
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( 
action, the Utah Supreme Court has suggested "equitable tolling" may still be 
available. See Estes v. Tobbs. 1999 UT 52, U 7, 979 P.2d 823. In a subsequent 
case, the Utah Supreme Court explained that the fact that "[n]o Utah court has 
ever found occasion to equitably toll a limitations period when there has not first 
been a demonstration that the party seeking the tolling could invoke the discovery , 
rule due to an excusable delay in discovering the underlying claim before the 
limitations period expired" does not mean that "no party may ever qualify for 
equitable relief in the absence of such a delay in discovering the claim," but 
"illustrate[s] the high bar this court has required those seeking such extraordinary 
relief to hurdle." Beaver County, 2006 UT, 6 f 29 (citation omitted). "As is true in 
all cases of equitable estoppel," for the doctrine to be invoked, the party seeking 
equitable tolling must show that it acted in a reasonable manner. Warren v. Provo 
City Corp., 838 P. 2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1992). Here, Mr. Garza clearly satisfies 
this criteria. He "acted in a reasonable manner" by timely filing his complaint 
under then-controlling Tenth Circuit precedent. Id 
A. Analogous Case Law Suggests Utah Courts Would Apply the 
Doctrine of Equitable Tolling when There Has Been a Change in 
the Settled Interpretation of the Law During the Course of the 
Litigation. 
Although no Utah court has squarely addressed whether an intervening 
change in the law amounts to "exceptional circumstances" sufficient to justify the 
equitable tolling of a statute of limitations, Utah case law suggests that the present 
15132496.4 9 
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facts do constitute such "exceptional circumstances." For example, an analogous 
set of circumstances is presented when a party failed to raise an issue before the 
trial court and then sought to raise the issue on appeal. Utah courts apply the 
"exceptional circumstances" standard to such situations and have found that this 
standard is satisfied when there has been an intervening change in the law. 
In Utah v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the defendant moved to 
suppress the evidence (cocaine) on the basis that the officer's stop was a "pretext 
stop to conduct a fishing expedition type search," and that the subsequent search 
of defendant's car and the seizure of the cocaine violated the defendant's state and 
federal constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id at 
1130. The district court agreed. IdL The State appealed, arguing, in relevant part, 
that the court should abandon the "pretext doctrine." Id. The court of appeals 
reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously focused entirely on the officer's 
subjective state of mind in determining whether the stop was a pretext stop. Id. 
Before the Supreme Court, the State urged the court to reject the pretext 
doctrine and the defendant argued the doctrine should be adopted under article I, 
sections 14 and 24 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 1134. The State argued that the 
defendant had waived the state constitutional analysis by failing to raise the issue 
before the trial court. Id. at 1134 n.2. The court disagreed, stating, "We need not 
decide whether defendant's state constitutional arguments were adequately raised 
and argued before the trial court because 'exceptional circumstances' justify our 
15132496.4 10 
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I 
( 
entertaining them on appeal." Id. (emphasis added). 
The court found the existence of "exceptional circumstances" because at 
the time of the defendant's suppression hearing, "the pretext doctrine was the 
controlling rule of Fourth Amendment law as interpreted by the court of appeals" 
and so the defendant "had no reason to argue that the doctrine be adopted under , 
article I, section 14 until the State challenged the doctrine on appeal." Id. (citations 
omitted). Similarly, the "arguments under article I, section 24 did not appear 
applicable until the court of appeals ruled that equal protection policies constrain 
us to uphold the pretext doctrine." Id. (quotation omitted).3 
Subsequent to Lopez, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "exceptional 
circumstances is a concept that is used sparingly, properly reserved for truly 
exceptional situations, for cases . . . involving rare procedural anomalies." State v. 
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added). Where such 
anomalies exist, the exceptional circumstances doctrine allows the court to reach 
an unpreserved issue where the failure to do so would be manifestly unjust. See 
State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, If 11, 253 P.3d 1082. 
Here, as in Lopez, we are presented with a procedural anomaly giving rise 
to "exceptional circumstances": a change in the settled interpretation of the law 
3
 See also State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) (finding 
exceptional circumstances allowing the defendant to raise the issue of whether 
depraved indifference was a culpable state of mind for attempted second degree 
murder even though not raised at trial because in a case decided after the trial, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that Utah does not recognize the crime of attempted 
depraved indifference homicide). 
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during the course of the litigation. Also as in Lopez, "the settled interpretation of 
the law favored the defendant" - i.e., the party seeking application of the equitable 
doctrine, Mr. Garza. See Hill v. Estate of Alfred 2009 UT 28, If 27, 216 P.3d 929 
(discussing unique procedural posture of Lopez); see also State v. McCloud, 2005 
UT App 466, ffif 14-15, 126 P.3d 775 (vacating criminal conviction because 
"exceptional circumstances" exist where a change in the law precluded the statute 
of limitations issue from being raised at trial). Therefore, like the defendant in 
Lopez, who had no need "to argue for a different interpretation of the law below 
because the existing interpretation produced the outcome he desired," Mr. Garza 
had no need to file his complaint within four years of his arrest because the 
existing interpretation of the law indicated (indeed, required) that he wait until his 
conviction was reversed. See Hill 2009 UT 28, Tj 27. And once Wallace was 
decided, Mr. Garza could do nothing to correct the situation. 
Accordingly, the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine preserves Mr. 
Garza's claim because strict application of the statute of limitations in the face of 
an intervening change in the settled interpretation of the law would be inequitable. 
B. The Balancing Test Required by Utah's Law of Equitable 
Tolling Favors a Finding of Exceptional Circumstances 
Sufficient to Justify the Equitable Tolling of the Statute of 
Limitations. 
Under Utah case law, an intervening change in the law which makes a 
timely filing untimely justifies invoking equitable tolling of the statute of 
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limitations. Under the balancing test required by Utah law to invoke the doctrine 
of equitable tolling, Mr. Garza's hardship far outweighs any burden the tolling of 
the statute of limitations would impose on Officer Burnett, and, therefore, the 
limitations period applicable to Mr. Garza's claims should be equitably tolled. 
Given the unanticipated change in the law effected by Wallace v. Kato, < 
whether equitable tolling should apply in Mr. Garza's case depends on balancing 
the equities. That balance should be struck in Mr. Garza's favor. Under Utah law, 
i 
"[t]he ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional circumstances 
is a question of law and turns on a balancing test that examines the hardship the 
statute of limitations would impose on the plaintiff as compared with any , 
prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of 
time." Ottens v. McNeil 2010 UT App 237, f 62, 239 P.3d 308 (quotations and 
alterations omitted). Factors which may be relevant to this balancing test include 
"whether the defendant's problems caused by the passage of time are greater than 
the plaintiff s, whether the defendant performed a technical service that the 
plaintiff cannot reasonably have been expected to evaluate, and whether the claim 
has aged to the point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, 
and the parties cannot remember basic events." Sew v. Security Title Co. of S. ' 
Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). 
Here, the balancing test favors Mr. Garza because the policy against stale 
claims is outweighed by the unique circumstances of his hardship. See Myers v. 
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McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 1981). Indeed, Officer Burnett has never 
asserted otherwise. (See, e.g., 10th Cir. Supp'l Br. of Appellee at 9-10 (arguing that 
Mr. Garza has submitted "no evidence" that Officer Burnett will not suffer any 
prejudice, but declining to dispute Mr. Garza's assertion); see also Appx. 14-45, 
78-119.) In fact, Officer Burnett will suffer no prejudice as a result of the passage 
of time. See Ottens, 2010 UT App 237, % 63. Prior to the Wallace decision, Mr. 
Garza's claim was timely and Officer Burnett did and should have anticipated the 
potential of a lawsuit until February 2009. See, e.g., Larson v. Snow College, 189 
F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1298 (D. Utah 2000) (four-year limitations period applies to 
§ 1983 claims brought in Utah). In addition, the claim has not aged to the point 
that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, or parties cannot 
remember basic events. See Sew, 902 P.2d at 636. Indeed, the underlying facts 
are undisputed. (See 10th Cir. Supp'l Br. of Appellee at v (Officer Burnett states 
expressly that he agrees with all of the relevant facts set forth in Mr. Garza's 
Statement of Facts that relate to the events that gave rise to Mr. Garza's § 1983 
claim).) 
Tolling the limitations period is therefore not inconsistent with the 
underlying Utah policy that "statutes of limitations are designed to promote justice 
by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to 
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." Myers, 635 P.2d at 86 (quotation omitted). In contrast, applying the 
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four-year statute of limitations to Mr. Garza will result in Mr. Garza losing his 
cause of action completely. 
Because Officer Burnett will suffer no prejudice (and cannot argue 
otherwise) and Mr. Garza will suffer significant hardship, the balancing test favors 
a finding of exceptional circumstances and the statute of limitations should be 
equitably tolled. 
II. OTHER FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS AGREE THAT THE 
CHANGE IN THE LAW BROUGHT ABOUT BY WALLACE GIVES 
RISE TO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE 
APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE TOLLING. 
While not controlling here, it is at least persuasive that a number of federal 
district courts have concluded that a change in the settled interpretation of the law 
-such as that brought about by Wallace-gives rise to an exceptional circumstance 
justifying the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. For example, in 
Hargroves v. City of New York, 694 F. Supp. 2d 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), the 
plaintiffs brought claims under § 1983 for illegal stop and detention, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, and violation of plaintiffs' equal protection rights. Id at 
202. The events which gave rise to the lawsuit occurred on March 20, 1998; 
plaintiffs were convicted on May 23, 2000; and on July 29, 2002, the convictions 
were reversed. See id. at 203, 206. In relevant part, the plaintiffs commenced their 
lawsuit on April 4, 2003, but under Wallace, the plaintiffs' limitations period 
expired in March 2001 because § 1983 claims brought in New York are subject to 
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a three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 210. 
In New York, like Utah, "[e]quitable tolling is available only in rare and 
exceptional circumstances, where the court finds that extraordinary circumstances 
prevented a party from timely performing a required act, and that the party acted 
with reasonable diligence throughout the period he sought to toll." Id. at 211 
(quotations and alterations omitted). The district court in Hargroves concluded that 
"the change in law occasioned by Wallace is the type of extraordinary 
circumstance that justifies equitable tolling." Id.4 The claims brought by the 
plaintiffs in Hargroves, like those of Mr. Garza, were "timely when brought" and 
"are now untimely under the holding of Wallace." See Hargroves, 694 F. Supp. 2d 
at 212. The district court reasoned that the plaintiffs were diligent in pursuing their 
claims and "could not have predicted the still-years-away change in the law." Id. 
The court concluded that "[t]his constitutes precisely the sort of extraordinary 
circumstances in which equitable tolling should operate to save Plaintiffs5 claims." 
Id.; see also Wharton v. County of Nassau, Case No. 07-CV-2137, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 99174, at *10-13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010) (unpublished) ("Plaintiffs, 
through no fault of their own, relied on then-authoritative Second Circuit 
4
 See also Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 2d 768, 771 -75 (E.D. Mich. 2007) 
(concluding that plaintiff who brought a § 1983 claim for illegal seizure in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment may obtain relief from the statute of 
limitations under the doctrine of equitable tolling when "the delay in filing is the 
product of an understandable confusion about the legal nature of her claim, that 
confusion is created by the courts themselves, and the delay does not result simply 
from the plaintiffs lack of diligence" (citations and quotation omitted)). 
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precedent to their detriment, and strict application of Wallace would effectively 
deprive Plaintiffs of their cause of action."); Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, Civil 
Action No. 07-122-DLB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17301, at *22 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 6, 
2008) (unpublished) ("Holding that Plaintiffs claims herein are now time-barred 
post-Wallace by the applicable statutes of limitation would result in Heck 
ultimately producing immunity for the Defendants, a scenario the Supreme Court 
deemed unacceptable."). This same reasoning should apply here. 
In granting Officer Burnett's motion for summary judgment, the federal 
district court endeavored to distinguish the cases applying equitable tolling to 
mitigate the effects of Wallace's changes to the law. It relied on three 
considerations: (1) none of the cases were based on Utah law; (2) Utah already 
provides a long limitations period for § 1983 claims; and (3) none of the cases 
involved "such an extreme delay as found here." (Appx. at 143-44.) The analysis 
is erroneous. 
First, the fact that the cases that have addressed the specific question are not 
decided under Utah lawr simply begs the question. The question of whether Utah's 
principles of equitable tolling apply where there has been an intervening change in 
the law is a matter of first impression. Moreover, nothing in the cases referenced 
by the district court which are discussed above supports the district court's 
conclusion that the laws in the relevant states are "substantially broader, and hence 
more lenient, than Utah's." To the contrary, the language used by those courts 
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mirrors the language used by Utah courts. 
Second, the fact that Utah provides a four-year limitations period - one 
year longer than the three year periods at issue in Hargroves and Kucharski -
hardly affects the exceptional circumstances analysis. And the mere fact that 
Utah's statute is four years and not three does not suggest that Utah would be less 
likely to apply equitable tolling to these facts.6 Arguably, Utah's allowance of a 
5
 Compare, e.g., Hargroves, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 211 ("Equitable tolling is available 
only in rare and exceptional circumstances, where the court finds that 
extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from timely performing a required 
act, and that the party acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he 
sought to toll." (quotations and alterations omitted)) and Kucharski, 526 F. Supp. 
2d at 772 (citing Ward v. Siano, 730 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) 
("Equitable or judicial tolling ordinarily applies to a specific extraordinary 
situation in which it would be unfair to allow a statute of limitations defense to 
prevail because of the defendant's bad faith or other particular and unusual 
inequities.")) with Beaver County, 2006 UT, 6 ^ 29 (court requires "high bar") and 
Warren, 838 P.2d at 1130 (the party seeking to toll the statute of limitations must 
show it "acted in a reasonable manner"); see also 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation of 
Actions § 174 "(The time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are 
customarily subject to equitable tolling if such tolling is necessary to prevent 
unfairness to a diligent plaintiff. However, equitable tolling, which allows a 
plaintiff to initiate an action beyond the statute of limitations deadline, is typically 
available only if the claimant was prevented in some extraordinary way from 
exercising his or her rights, or, in other words, if the relevant facts present 
sufficiently rare and exceptional circumstances that would warrant application of 
the doctrine." (footnotes omitted)). 
Utah's four-year limitations period applicable to federal § 1983 claims is neither 
unique nor the most generous. See, e.g., Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1190 
(10th Cir. 2010) (four-year limitations period applies to § 1983 claims brought in 
Wyoming); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(plaintiff must bring a § 1983 claim arising in Florida within four years); Bishop v. 
Crawford, No. 1:10-CV-156-CEJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6225, at *17 (E.D. Mo. 
Jan. 24, 2011) (unpublished) ("The State of Missouri's five-year statute of 
limitations for general personal injury claims is applicable to causes of action 
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relatively generous limitations period suggests it would favor the application of 
the doctrine of equitable tolling in circumstances such as these. Officer Burnett 
cannot show prejudice here because even under the rule in Wallace, a defendant 
could not have felt confident of falling outside the limitations period before April 
of 2006, only six months before Mr,. Garza filed suit. 
Finally, the district court rather oddly mischaracterizes Mr. Garza's case as 
one of "extreme delay." The district court illogically suggests that Mr. Garza was 
dilatory in filing his suit and that Mr. Garza failed to offer any explanation for this 
delay. (Appx. at 144.) But at the time Mr. Garza filed suit, his claims were timely. 
The district court's reasoning assumes Mr. Garza could know that Wallace would 
be decided and that it would vastly shorten the time he had to file his claims. In 
fact, Mr. Garza did not know and could not have known that Wallace would be 
decided and that it would dramatically shorten the time he had to file his claims. 
By filing his claims within twenty months of his conviction being overturned -
well within the four-year limitations period - Mr. Garza was, in fact, diligently 
based on § 1983."); Blair v. City of Omaha, No. 8:07CV295, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19365, at *15 (D. Neb. Mar. 3, 2010) (unpublished) ("In Nebraska, there is 
a four-year statute of limitations that applies to suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983."); Burns v. Town of Lamoine, 43 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D. Me. 1999) ("The 
statute of limitations for Section 1983 cases in Maine is six years."). 
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pursuing his claims. See Hargroves, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 212 ("Plaintiffs were 
diligent in pursuing their claims (each filing suit within a year after their 
convictions were overturned), and could not have predicted the still-years-away 
change in the law."). A plaintiff is obligated to file his or her complaint within the 
limitations period; there can be no justification for punishing a claimant for filing 
at a particular point within that period. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY REASONS FAVOR APPLICATION OF 
EQUITABLE TOLLING UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The public policy reasons served by limitations periods favor application of 
equitable tolling under the circumstances presented by Mr. Garza's case. "A 
statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time 
after a legal right has been violated or the remedy for the wrong committed is 
deemed waived." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). 
"[T]he core purpose of any statute of limitations is to compel exercise of a right 
within a reasonable time to avoid stale claims, loss of evidence, and faded 
memories." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 322 (Utah 1997); see also 
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) ("statutes of limitations are 
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims 
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have 
faced, and witnesses have disappeared" (quotation omitted)). Equitably tolling the 
statute of limitations under the circumstances presented by Mr. Garza's case is 
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I 
consistent with this core purpose. Mr. Garza exercised his right within a 
reasonable time-filing well within the statute of limitations at the time. Further, as 
I 
noted above, the underlying facts are undisputed so a loss of evidence or faded 
memories is not an issue here. 
Equitably tolling the limitations period under these circumstances also is
 ( 
consistent with the principles outlined in the Utah Constitution. Article I, section 
11 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
' 1 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from i 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11. This section "establishes that the framers of the 
Constitution intended that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of 
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights." Berry, 717 P.2d at
 ( 
675 (emphasis added). The intervening change in the law brought about by 
Wallace that rendered untimely Mr. Garza's previously timely claims is nothing 
but arbitrary. Equitably tolling the limitations period under these unique and 
anomalous circumstances is, therefore, consistent with Utah's open courts clause. 
Cf. Berneau, 2009 UT 87, f 27 n.5 ("[T]here may well be a denial of constitutional 
rights pursuant to the open courts clause of Utah Constitution, Article I, section 11 
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in foreclosing persons from access to the court under these unusual 
circumstances." (quotation and alteration 'omitted)). 
On the other hand, refusing to equitably toll the limitations period under 
these circumstances may raise constitutional concerns. "To be constitutional, a 
statute of limitations must allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action after a 
cause of action arises." Berry, 717 P.2d at 672 (emphasis added). 
"It may be properly conceded that all statutes of 
limitation must proceed on the idea that the party has 
full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the 
courts. A statute could not bar the existing rights of 
claimants without affording this opportunity; if it 
should do so, it would not be a statute of limitations, 
but an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, 
whatever might be the purport of its provisions." 
Id (quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902); emphasis added). While 
we are faced with a judicial decision and not a legislatively amended statute of 
limitations, the effect is the same: Mr. Garza's previously timely claims were 
rendered untimely effective immediately upon issuance of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Wallace. "[T]he law is well settled that statutes affecting 
limitations may be amended and shortened without impinging on any 
constitutional rights of a party, provided always that a sufficient period of grace is 
allowed to enable a plaintiff to maintain his cause of action if he will follow the 
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I 
new law." Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919, 920 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).7 
Here, Mr. Garza was not provided any "period of grace" to enable him to 
maintain his cause of action. Instead, his claim-filed within four years of his 
conviction being overturned as required by then-controlling circuit precedent-was 
rendered untimely immediately and without notice of the impending change. 
Refusing to equitably toll the statute of limitations under such circumstances 
would be manifestly unjust. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth herein, the Court should answer the certified 
question in the affirmative and hold that, under Utah law, the intervening change 
in controlling law brought about by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wallace 
v. Kato merits equitably tolling the statute of limitations under the circumstances 
7
 See also City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 105 P.3d 1163, 1168n.6 
(Ariz. 2005) ("When vested rights of private parties are involved, constitutional 
considerations prevent an amended statute of limitations from immediately barring 
a claim that would have been timely filed under the previously existing statute."); 
Willmar v. Short-Elliott-Hendrickson, Inc., 475 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Minn. 1991) 
(because "the City had no opportunity to comply with the 1988 amendment, as it 
was approved approximately six months after the City served its summons and 
complaint on SHE, . . . the amended statute cannot be applied to the City's 
claims"); People ex rel. Dep't of Revenue v. National Liquors Empire, Inc., 510 
N.E.2d 495, 497 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1987) ("an amendment shortening the 
limitation period will not be applied retroactively so as to terminate an action filed 
within the limitation period prior to the effective date of the amendment"). In sum, 
"[t]he retrospective application of a shortened limitation period is permissible 
provided a party has a reasonable time to avail himself or herself of a remedy 
before the statute cuts off his or her right of action." 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation of 
Actions §51 (2d ed. 2012). 
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presented by Mr. Garza's case. 
Dated: June 25, 2012 
Respectfully submitted, 
Amber M. Mettler 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Michael D. Zimmerman 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC 
Attorneys for Gerardo Thomas Garza 
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Lexis Nexis4 
4 of 10 DOCUMENTS 
Caution 
As of: Jun 15, 2012 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff- Appellee, vs. GERARDO THOMAS 
GARZA, also known as Jerry Garcia, Defendant - Appellant. 
No. 04-4046 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
125 Fed. Appx. 927; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1659 
February 2,2005, Filed 
NOTICE: [**1] RULES OF THE TENTH CIR-
CUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION 
TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO 
THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT. 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Related proceeding at 
Garza v. Burnett, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27524 (D. Utah 
Mar. 23, 2010) 
PRIOR HISTORY: (D. Utah). (DC. No. 
02-CR-42-01-JTG). 
United States v. Garza, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 2003 US 
Dist. LEXIS 11095 (D. Utah, 2003) 
DISPOSITION: Reversed. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed a 
decision of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Utah, which denied defendant's motion to sup-
press. 
OVERVIEW: Police officers conducted a "knock and 
talk" investigation at a motel. After inquiring of a desk 
clerk as to whether there were activities leading him to 
belief drug use or trafficking might be taking place, the 
clerk gave officers two room numbers, indicating an un-
usually high volume of telephone calls and visitors. The 
clerk told the officers that the sole occupant of one room 
gave a local address, did not have a reservation, and paid 
in cash. The officers knocked on the door of one room 
and entered with the occupant's consent. Ultimately, the 
officers pushed opened the bathroom door, finding de-
fendant, whom they arrested. Defendant had standing to 
challenge the search of the bathroom; although not a 
registered guest, as a guest invited by the occupant, he 
had a legitimate privacy expectation. The government 
sought to uphold denial of the motion on a protective 
sweep rationale. However, the instant court noted that a 
protective sweep could only be performed incident to an 
arrest. Even assuming, the protective sweep doctrine 
encompassed other circumstances, no objectively rea-
sonable belief existed that the bathroom contained a per-
son posing a danger to the officers or other. 
OUTCOME: The district court's decision was reversed. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Pretrial Motions & Pro-
cedures > Suppression of Evidence 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > General Overview 
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125 Fed. Appx. 927, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1659, ** 
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i 
[HNl] In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, 
the court views the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the government. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De 
Novo Review 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Clearly Erroneous Review > Findings of Fact 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Clearly Erroneous Review > Search & Sei-
zure 
[HN2] The court of appeals accepts the district court's 
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous; how-
ever, the ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness is a question of lawr which the court of 
appeals reviews de novo. 
Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental 
Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Ex-
pectation of Privacy 
[HN3] An overnight guest in a hotel room or in the home 
of a friend has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
premises. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > 
Warrantless Searches > Protective Sweeps 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > General Overview 
[HN4] The court of appeals may uphold the district 
court's ruling on any legal grounds supported by the rec-
ord, even if the court of appeals' rationale differs from 
the district court. The court of appeals may do so when 
the defendant has had an opportunity to fully litigate any 
contested operative facts necessary to the court of ap-
peals' resolution and the district court has made findings 
on any such facts. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > 
Warrantless Searches > Protective Sweeps 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > 
Warrantless Searches > Search Incident to Lawful Ar-
rest > Extent & Manner of Search 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > 
Warrantless Searches > Search Incident to Lawful Ar-
rest > Proximity of Search to Arrest 
[HN5] A protective sweep is a quick and limited search 
of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to pro-
tect the safety of police officers or others. 
Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents 
[HN6] Just as the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit is not at will to overrule the United States 
Supreme Court, the court of appeals also may not over-
rule a panel of the court of appeals absent an en banc 
decision. 
Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental 
Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances 
Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental 
Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > 
Warrantless Searches > Protective Sweeps 
[HN7] A protective sweep may only be performed inci-
dent to an arrest. 
COUNSEL: For UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff- Appellee: Michael S. Lee, Office of the United 
States Attorney, District of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT. 
For GERARDO THOMAS GARZA, aka Jerry Garcia, 
Defendant - Appellant: Scott Keith Wilson, Office of the 
Federal Public Defender, Salt Lake City, UT. 
jnUDGES: Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and TYM-
KOVICH, Circuit Judges. TYMKOVICH, J., concurring. 
OPINION BY: Paul J. Kelly Jr., Circuit Judge 
OPINION 
[*928] ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 
* This order and judgment is not binding prec-
edent, except under the doctrines of law of the 
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This 
court generally disfavors the citation of orders 
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judg-
ment may be cited under the terms and conditions 
of 10th Cir.R. 36.3. 
Defendant-Appellant Gerardo Thomas Garza en-
tered a conditional plea to possession of a firearm by a 
felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of meth-
amphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 844, reserving the right to 
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to sup-
press. He was sentenced to 37 [**2] months imprison-
ment and three years supervised release. Our jurisdiction 
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse. 
Background 
On April 19, 2002, Officers McGuire and Burnett of 
the Ogden City Police department conducted a "knock 
and talk" investigation at the Motel 6 in Ogden, Utah. 
They contacted the desk clerk and inquired whether there 
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125 Fed. Appx. 927, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1659, ** 
were any activities at the motel that would lead the clerk 
to believe that drug use or drug trafficking might be tak-
ing place. II R. at 8-9. The clerk on duty had previously 
been trained by the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike 
Force to look for excessive foot traffic, a high volume of 
phone calls, guests with local addresses, lack of a room 
reservation, and [*929] cash payment, as indicative of 
drug use and sales. II R. at 7-8. The clerk gave the offic-
ers two room numbers, indicating, without specificity as 
to which room, that there was an unusually high volume 
of telephone calls and visitors. II R. at 10, 29. The clerk 
also told the officers that when Rosa Reyes Ambris,l the 
sole registered occupant of one of the rooms, checked 
into the motel, she provided a local address, did not have 
a reservation for the room, and paid [**3] in cash. II R. 
at 36-40. 
1 Ms. Ambris apparently used the surname 
"Reyes" on the date of the incident. 
Based on this information, the officers knocked on 
the door of Room 133. II R. at 10. When the officers 
knocked on the door, a male voice asked who was there, 
and the officers announced themselves. II R. at 10-11, 
68. After a delay, the police knocked again. Shortly 
thereafter, a partially clothed female, later identified as 
Ms. Ambris, came to the door. II R. at 11, 68. The offic-
ers identified themselves and asked if they might speak 
with her. Ms. Ambris responded by asking if it would be 
OK for her to first get dressed. II R. at 12. 
When she returned to the door, she opened it and 
backed in so that the officers might enter. II R. at 13, 57. 
The district court found that the officers entered the room 
with Ms. Ambris's consent. I R. Doc. 37 at 9. Upon en-
tering, the officers heard the bathroom door slam with 
force. II R. at 13-14. However, the bathroom door did 
not remain folly closed. II R. at 13-14, 72. When [**4] 
asked if anyone else was there, Ms. Ambris stated that 
her boyfriend, Mr. Garza, was in the bathroom. II R. at 
13-14. The officers asked Mr. Garza to speak with them, 
but he refused to respond. II R. at 14. 
A few moments later, one of the officers pushed the 
bathroom door open, revealing Mr. Garza slumped in the 
corner. When asked why they wanted to go in the bath-
room, Officer McGuire stated that he was concerned that 
Mr. Garza was destroying evidence of drug use or dis-
tribution. II R. at 14. When asked the same question, 
Agent Burnett stated: 
I didn't think anything specifically. I 
thought there was one of many things that 
could be happening in there. Arming 
himself, barricading himself, destroying 
evidence, destroying meth lab chemicals 
which if mixed can be dangerous . . . . 
The reason you can assume why he was 
hiding runs the gamut. They were all bad. 
II R. 75. Once in the bathroom, the officers asked Mr. 
Garza to show his hands. When Mr. Garza did so, the 
officers could see that he was holding a firearm. II R. at 
76. The officers drew their weapons and took cover. Mr. 
Garza was arrested shortly thereafter. When taken into 
custody, Mr. Garza was in possession of [**5] meth-
amphetamine. II R. at 80. After the arrest, Ms. Ambris 
consented to a search of the motel room, during which 
the officers found a small amount of marijuana. II R. at 
26-27. 
The district court denied Mr. Garza's motion to sup-
press. The parties agreed that the officers' entry into the 
motel room was consensual from the time of the entry 
until the time the officers entered the bathroom. Though 
the district court's order is not entirely clear, the district 
court apparently thought that the officers' conduct could 
only be justified by a finding of probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances. I R. Doc. 37 at 5. The court then 
concluded that because reasonable suspicion existed, 
probable cause also existed. IR. Doc. 37 at 5. 
[*930] The district court also found exigent cir-
cumstances. I R. Doc. 37 at 7-8. The court found that 
there was little evidence of criminal activity in this case, 
but that when the officers pushed the bathroom door 
open "they reasonably believed that their safety was de-
pendent upon knowing who was in the bathroom and 
what he was doing." I R. Doc. 37 at 8. In the context of 
its exigent circumstances holding, the court also found 
that the officers had reasonable suspicion [**6] of evi-
dence destruction, possession of dangerous chemicals, 
and a suspect arming himself, thereby implicating the 
officers' safety. I R. Doc. 37 at 6-7. 
Discussion 
[HN1] In reviewing the denial of a motion to sup-
press, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the government." United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d 
959, 964 (10th Cir. 2004). [HN2] We accept the district 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous; 
however, the ultimate determination of Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness is a question of law which we re-
view de novo. Id. 
As a threshold matter, Mr. Garza has standing to 
challenge the search of the bathroom since [HN3] "an 
overnight guest in a hotel room or in the home of a friend 
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises." 
United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 
1991) (discussing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 109 
L. Ed. 2d 85, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990)). Although not a 
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registered guest, Mr. Garza, as a guest invited by Ms. 
Ambris, II R. at 44, has a legitimate privacy expectation. 
United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
Turning to the merits of the appeal, the [**7] gov-
ernment concedes that "there can be no serious dispute 
that the district court erred in holding that the officers' 
warrantless entry into the motel bathroom was justified 
under the exigent circumstances exception." Aplee. Br. at 
8. The government urges us to uphold the denial of the 
motion to suppress on a protective sweep rationale rely-
ing upon Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 108 L. Ed. 2d 
276, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990). Aplee. Br. at 11. [HN4] We 
may uphold the district court's ruling on any legal 
grounds supported by the record, even if our rationale 
differs from the district court. United States v. Edwards, 
242 F.3d928, 935 (10th Cir. 2001). We may do so when 
the defendant has had an opportunity to fully litigate any 
contested operative facts necessary to our resolution and 
the district court has made findings on any such facts. 
United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 649 n.l (9th 
Cir. 2000) ("All of the evidence is in the record and all 
of the relevant facts have been resolved."). It gives us 
some pause that the government's concession and alter-
nate theory comes in its answer brief on appeal, thereby 
only giving Mr. Garza the opportunity to meet [**8] it 
for the first time on appeal. However, Mr. Garza does not 
argue that he has been unable to develop facts and meets 
the alternate theory on its merits. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment's reliance on the protective sweep doctrine fails 
for two reasons. 
Mr. Garza argues that the protective sweep doctrine 
cannot be relied upon to render the officers' search lawful 
since a protective sweep may only be performed incident 
to an arrest. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 327; United States v. 
Davis, 290 F3d 1239, 1242 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Smith, 131 F3d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1997). 
The government argues that the statements in Buie and 
Davis are dicta, Aplee. Br. at 20-26, and that police may 
perform a protective sweep without an arrest. United 
States v. Gould, 364 F3d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 2004); 
United States [*931] v. Taylor, 248 F3d 506, 513 (6th 
Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1282 
(9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Patrick, 294 U.S. App. 
DC 393, 959 F2d991, 996-97 (DC Cir. 1992). 
First, the Supreme Court's statement in Buie that 
[HN5] a [**9] "protective sweep" is "a quick and lim-
ited search of premises, incident to an arrest and con-
ducted to protect the safety of police officers or others" is 
not dicta. 494 U.S. at 327. While the Court could have 
relied on facts other than that the police search in that 
case was incident to a lawful arrest, the Court clearly 
found this fact to be important, if not essential. Buie, 494 
U.S. at 330-32. Nevertheless, even if the Court's defini-
tion of a protective sweep as a search performed incident 
to an arrest can be construed as dicta, '"this court consid-
ers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly 
as by the Court's outright holdings, particularly when the 
dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later statements.'" 
United States v. Nelson, 383 F3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 
2004) (quoting Gaylor v. United States, 74F.3d214, 217 
(10th Cir. 1996)). 
[HN6] Just as we are not at will to overrule the Su-
preme Court, we also may not overrule a panel of this 
court absent an en banc decision. In re Smith, 10 F.3d 
723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993). We have twice found that 
[HN7] a protective sweep may only be performed inci-
dent to [**10] an arrest. In United States v. Smith, this 
court applied the Supreme Court's definition of "protec-
tive sweep" and upheld the admission of evidence found 
incident to the execution of an arrest warrant. 131 F.3d 
at 1396. Likewise, in Davis, this court disposed of the 
government's argument that police were allowed to per-
form a protective sweep before any arrest was made by 
pointing to the Supreme Court's definition of "protective 
sweep." 290 F.3d at 1242 n.4. Because Buie defined a 
"protective sweep" as a '"quick and limited search of the 
premises, incident to an arrest,1" the court found that the 
government's argument that a protective sweep could 
take place before an arrest must fail. Id. (quoting Buie, 
494 US. at 327) (emphasis in original). 
Even assuming that Buie's protective sweep doctrine 
encompasses circumstances other than an officer's pres-
ence for purposes of making an arrest, no objectively 
reasonable belief existed that the bathroom contained a 
person posing a danger to either the officers or others. In 
general, a protective sweep is a brief search of a premises 
during an arrest to ensure officer safety if [**11] the 
officers have a reasonable belief of danger. Buie, 494 
U.S. at 327. The Fourth Amendment allows a protective 
sweep if police have "a reasonable belief based on spe-
cific and articulable facts which, taken together with the 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants 
the officer in believing that the area swept harbors an 
individual posing a danger to the officer or others." Id. 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Protective 
sweeps are justified by the interest of the officers in as-
suring themselves that the premises are "not harboring 
other persons who are dangerous and who could unex-
pectedly launch an attack." Id. at 333. Thus, a protective 
sweep is "appropriate only where officers reasonably 
perceive an immediate danger to their safety." United 
States v. Owens, 782 F2d 146, 151 (10th Cir. 1986). 
"We should evaluate the circumstances as they would 
have appeared to prudent, cautious and trained officers." 
United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 
2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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The officers' protective sweep of the hotel room, in-
cluding forcing the bathroom [**12] door open, fails to 
comply with these standards. As stated by the govern-
ment, the specific and articulable facts the officers pos-
sessed, after speaking with the front [*932] desk at-
tendant at the motel, were that there were two rooms in 
the motel that had questionable occupants, in that (1) the 
rooms had been rented by local customers who paid in 
cash, (2) there had been a high volume of foot traffic and 
telephone calls to and from one of the rooms, and (3) the 
hotel was located in an area with past criminal activity. 
The record does not specify which of the two rooms had 
a high volume of foot traffic or telephone calls. Aplee. 
Br. at 17. 
However, the officers had no knowledge of who 
occupied either room or if the occupants had histories of 
firearms violations, drug trafficking, or violent crime. II 
R. at 33, 66-67; see United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 
1095, 1097 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding reasonable belief of 
danger based in part on an officer's knowledge of occu-
pant's previous firearm violations). Further, the officers 
were conducting a warrantless "knock and talk" investi-
gation. This is unlike Buie where the Court emphasized 
that the officers had an arrest warrant [**13] allowing 
the officers to search anywhere in the house that Buie 
might have been found. Buie, 494 US. at 330. Moreover, 
as opposed to situations where officers perform a protec-
tive sweep after an arrest, Ms. Ambris voluntarily con-
sented to the officers' entry. 
Once in the room, the officers did not notice any-
thing particularly suspicious about Ms. Ambris or the 
room, such as evidence of drug use or drug trafficking. II 
R. at 29, 33, 82; see United States v. Cavely, 318 K3d 
987, 995-96 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding reasonable belief 
of hidden danger where the police had previously recov-
ered firearms in the house, the suspect arrested had fuel 
used to make methamphetamine on his hands, possessed 
large amounts of cash and methamphetamine, and ad-
mitted that other people were in the house). 
After Ms. Ambris consented to the officers' entry, 
the officers heard the bathroom door shut and knew that 
the male who had first responded to their knock was in 
the bathroom and refused to communicate with them. Ill 
R. at 81. While it is true that the district court found that 
the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
and that the person in the bathroom [**14] posed a 
safety threat (in the context of a different analysis), there 
simply are not specific, articulable facts in this record 
that distinguish this from any time a person in a bath-
room (one of the most private rooms in a dwelling) de-
clines a consensual encounter with the police. 
The government argues that Mr. Garza's refusal to 
respond and forceful closure of the bathroom door was 
"suspicious, evasive, and arguably threatening," such 
that, combined with the other facts known at the time, 
the officers had a reasonable belief that Mr. Garza and 
Ms. Ambris were involved in criminal activity, namely 
distribution of narcotics. Aplee. Br. at 18. Because drug 
distribution is "likely to involve the use of weapons," cf. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 
1868 (1968) (determining that a robbery is likely to in-
volve weapons), the government argues that the officers 
had a reasonable basis to fear for their safety. Aplee. Br. 
at 19. 
We are not persuaded. As previously discussed, Ms. 
Ambris freely consented to the officers' entry, thus ex-
hibiting a willingness to cooperate. Once in the room, the 
officers did not smell drugs or hear running water, which 
might indicate [**15] the possible disposal of narcotics. 
II R. at 33, 83. Because Mr. Garza had no obligation to 
respond to the officers, the government's argument that 
Mr. Garza's failure to respond created a safety threat suf-
ficient to allow a protective sweep carries little weight. 
In short, the government's [*933] theory simply is not 
linked to specific evidence that would support it as to 
this defendant~the increased foot traffic, the phone calls, 
the reputation of the neighborhood, the local customer 
paying for a room in cash, and the male occupant of the 
room shutting the bathroom door (perhaps to use the 
facilities) do not add up to a "reasonable belief that the 
bathroom "harbored an individual posing a danger to the 
officer or others." Buie, 494 U.S. at 327. 
REVERSED. 
Entered for the Court 
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 
Circuit Judge 
CONCUR BY: TYMKOVICH 
CONCUR 
TYMKOVICH, J., concurring. 
I agree with the majority that the "protective sweep" 
conducted by law enforcement officers was not anchored 
by reasonable suspicion. I therefore concur. 
I write separately to note some reservations about 
whether a protective sweep can ever be justified absent 
an arrest and the majority's application of [**16] Mar-
yland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 110 S 
Ct. 1093 (1990). In Buie, the Supreme Court articulated a 
doctrine of the warrantless protective sweep, a "quick 
and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and 
conducted to protect the safety of police officers and 
others." Id. at 327. The Court justified the sweep "as a 
precautionary matter," that could be conducted 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 6 
125 Fed. Appx. 927, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1659, ** 
< 
without probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, [to] look in closets and other 
spaces immediately adjoining the place of 
arrest from which an attack could be im-
mediately launched. Beyond that, howev-
er, we hold that there must be articulable 
facts which, taken together with the ra-
tional inferences from those facts, would 
warrant a reasonably prudent officer in 
believing that the area to be swept harbors 
an individual posing a danger to those on 
the arrest scene. This is no more and no 
less than was required in Terry and Long. 
Id. at 334. 
Two recent cases in this circuit have cited to Buie. 
The first, a 2002 case, involved the illegal, warrantless 
search of a home. The panel declined to apply the pro-
tective sweep rationale where the [**17] search was 
neither incident to an arrest nor supported by reasonable 
suspicion. See United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239 
(10th Cir. 2002). The second case, in 2004, extended 
Buie to situations involving "protective detentions." That 
panel held that in addition to a protective sweep the po-
lice may conduct a protective detention of individuals as 
long as there is a "reasonable and articulable suspicion of 
potential danger to the arresting officers." United States 
v. Maddox, 388 R3d 1356, 1367 (10th Cir. 2004). 
The question then is whether those cases, together 
with Buie, lay down a flat, per se rule-banning protective 
sweeps by law enforcement in every other context. That 
seems doubtful to me. We already know that the Su-
preme Court has allowed concern over officer safety to 
justify limited searches in non-arrest street encounters, 
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 
1868 (1968), and automobile stops, see Michigan v. 
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469. 
Buie was a natural extension of the logic of those cases. 
Against this legal backdrop, the Fifth Circuit sitting 
en banc recently confronted [**18] the very question of 
whether a protective sweep accompanied by a reasonable 
suspicion of danger must always be incident to an arrest. 
The court answered no. In United States v. Gould, 364 
F.3d 578, 588 (5th Cir. 2004), the court considered a 
situation where officers entered a mobile home with the 
permission of an occupant. During the encounter, the 
officers developed [*934] safety concerns, and, upon 
entering the home's bedroom, found firearms. Id. at 591. 
Looking to Buie, the court concluded that the Supreme 
Court's holding does not flatly bar protective sweeps 
during a lawful consensual encounter -where officers 
possess a reasonable suspicion that the home harbors an 
individual who poses a threat to their safety. Id. at 
584-593. The Gould Court's understanding of Buie 
would allow a protective sweep where (1) the police en-
ter a home lawfully, (2) the sweep is supported by rea-
sonable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors a 
dangerous individual, (3) the sweep is a cursory inspec-
tion for persons, and (4) the sweep is short, lasting no 
longer than necessary to dispel the threat. Id. at 587. 
Thus, Gould [**19] suggests that a protective 
sweep may be constitutional outside the arrest context if 
officers, pursuant to a lawful consensual encounter, de-
velop a reasonable suspicion that their safety is endan-
gered by a person hiding nearby.l 
1 A few other courts have also resisted a per se 
approach to Buie. See, e.g., United States v. Toy-
lor, 248 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (allowing pro-
tective sweep without an arrest); United States v. 
Patrick, 294 U.S. App. D.C. 393, 959 F.2d 991 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (allowing protective sweep after 
consensual entry). 
This, however, is not such a case. I agree with the 
majority that at the time of the sweep the officers here 
did not have a reasonable suspicion that the motel room 
harbored an individual posing a threat to them. The pro-
tective sweep was therefore not supportable. 
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OPINION BY: ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
MAUSKOPF, United States District Judge. 
Plaintiff, Joshua Wharton ("Wharton"), joined by his 
parents Gail and Jonathan Wharton, bring this civil rights 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law 
against the County of Nassau ("County of Nassau" or 
"County"), the Nassau County Police Department, Police 
Officers Phillip Kouril and Charles DeCaro, and Lieu-
tenant Michael H. McGovern alleging false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, municipal liability, violation of equal 
protection rights, excessive force, and negligence. De-
fendants move, and Plaintiffs [*2] cross-move, for 
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, De-
fendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 
IN PART, and Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED IN ITS 
ENTIRETY. 
BACKGROUND1 
1 The Court relies upon the facts in the parties' 
Rule 56.1 statements that are supported by the 
admissible evidence and not controverted by the 
record. 
This action arises out of the January 20, 2004 arrest 
and subsequent prosecution of seventeen-year-old Joshua 
Wharton. Wharton was arrested following an altercation 
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with Nassau County Police Officers Phillip Kouril and 
Charles DeCaro at a local Dunkin' Donuts franchise in 
Garden City Park, New York. Those events are summa-
rized briefly as follows: 
That evening, plain-clothed officers Kouril and 
DeCaro responded to a report of a disturbance at Mineola 
High School. In connection with this litigation, Kouril 
and DeCaro testified that, immediately prior to arriving 
on-scene, they passed a group of several black male 
teenagers heading north, away from Mineola High 
school and in the direction of the Dunkin' Donuts 
wherein Wharton was ultimately arrested. 
Upon arriving at Mineola High School, Kouril and 
DeCaro [*3] claim that a school official reported that 
four to five males had been ejected from the gym for 
creating a disturbance. According to the officers, the 
school official identified one of the ejected youths as 
"Joshua." Based on that information, and believing that 
the subject youths were possibly those that they had 
driven past earlier, the officers left Mineola High School 
and headed north to investigate a possible trespassing. 
Approximately one block north, the officers observed 
two black teenagers inside the Dunkin' Donuts. They 
contend that these youths ? later identified as Brian 
McGuad and "JJ" Snowden.— were part of the group they 
had seen earlier. 
It is not disputed that Kouril and DeCaro were in the 
process of questioning McGuad and Snowden about the 
Mineola High School incidents when Wharton, who had 
been at the Dunkin' Donuts counter, interjected. 
According to Wharton, he asked JJ what was going 
on, and that the plain-clothes officers who had yet to 
identify themselves, told him to "shut up" and demanded 
that he produce identification. Wharton admits being 
uncooperative and that his response was: "Fuck that, I'm 
not talking to you." Wharton then claims that he left the 
officers [*4] and proceeded to sit down. According to 
Wharton, the officers followed him to his table where — 
unprovoked — one of them pushed it aside, placed him in 
a headlock, and brought him to the ground. Wharton 
claims that one officer repeatedly kneed him in the head 
while the other officer held his left wrist in a "wrist 
lock," and that while he tried to avoid the officer's blows, 
he did not resist arrest. Wharton further maintains that, at 
no time prior to the altercation did either Kouril or 
DeCaro identify themselves, and that he only realized 
they were police officers immediately before he was ar-
rested when he heard the officers' walkie-talkies. 
The officers paint a very different picture of the in-
cident. They concede that they did not verbally identify 
themselves as law enforcement but state that their badges 
were displayed around their necks. The officers claim 
that upon questioning McGuad and Snowden, Wharton 
interrupted by telling his friends that they did not have to 
answer any questions. According to Kouril, Wharton 
stated, "[fjuck them. This is my hood and you don't have 
to speak to those fiickin' niggers." The officers allege that 
they asked Wharton for his identification and that [*5] 
he began screaming obscenities, and that customers were 
becoming alarmed and beginning to leave the store. The 
officers claim that they approached Wharton, and that he 
stood up and pushed the table into Kouril, stating "Fuck 
you" and "I don't give a shit." In response, the officers 
grabbed Wharton and pulled him to the ground. They 
testified that Wharton was flailing and resisting arrest, 
but that they were eventually able to handcuff him. 
Following the arrest, Wharton was brought to the 
Third Precinct and placed in a holding cell. At the pre-
cinct, Kouril and DeCaro spoke with the Desk Officer, 
Lieutenant Michael McGovern, regarding the factual 
details of the arrest. Based on the officers' narratives, 
McGovern determined that the facts were sufficient to 
charge Wharton with disorderly conduct, obstructing 
governmental administration in the second degree, and 
resisting arrest. 2 In the early morning of January 21, 
2004, Wharton was released from custody with a Desk 
Appearance Ticket. 
2 On June 18, 2004, the Nassau County Dis-
trict Attorney's Office charged Wharton with two 
additional counts of disorderly conduct. 
Plaintiff was prosecuted in the Nassau County Dis-
trict Court, First District, [*6] County of Nassau, and 
between March 3, 2004 and February 23, 2006, Wharton 
was required to make at least sixteen court appearances 
in his criminal case. A bench trial took place on Decem-
ber 12 and 13, 2005, and in a decision rendered on April 
24, 2006, the Honorable Sondra Pardes found Wharton 
not guilty on all charges. 
On July 21, 2006, Plaintiffs served a Notice of 
Claim upon the Nassau County Attorney's Office, and on 
May 24, 2007, Plaintiffs initiated this action. Defendants 
answered on December 7, 2007. Thereafter, the parties 
conducted discovery. Both parties now move for sum-
mary judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the plead-
ings, depositions, interrogatories, admissions, and affi-
davits demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact in dispute and that one party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Celotex Corp. v.Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 
2548, 91 L. Ed 2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of mate-
rial facts exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable 
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 
S. Ct. 2505, 91L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). 
In determining whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists, [*7] the evidence of the nonmovant "is to be 
believed" and the court must draw all "justifiable" or 
"reasonable" inferences in favor of the non-moving par-
ty. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H Kress & Co., 398 
U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 
(1970)); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195 n.l, 125 
S. Ct. 596, 160 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2004). Nevertheless, once 
the moving party has shown that there is no genuine is-
sue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law, "the nonmoving party must 
come forward with 'specific facts showing there is a gen-
uine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US. 574. 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 
89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) 
(emphasis in original). The non-moving party "may not 
rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated specu-
lation." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 
1998). In other words, the nonmovant must offer "con-
crete evidence from which a reasonable juror could re-
turn a verdict in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 
Where "the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at 
trial, summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the exist-
ence of an element essential to [its] case." Nebraska v. 
Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590, 113 S. Ct. 1689, 123 L. Ed. 
2d 317 (1993) [*8] (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[a] defendant 
moving for summary judgment must prevail if the plain-
tiff fails to come forward with enough evidence to create 
a genuine factual issue to be tried with respect to an ele-
ment essential to its case." Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 
253, 258 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
247-48). 
DISCUSSION 
I. Claims Against the Nassau County Police Depart-
ment 
Plaintiffs name the Nassau County Police Depart-
ment as a defendant in this action. Defendants argue, and 
Plaintiffs concede, that the Nassau County Police De-
partment is an administrative arm of the County of Nas-
sau and therefore lacks the capacity to be sued. See 
Aguilera v. Cnty. of Nassau, 425 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323 
(E.D.N. Y 2006) ("[u]nder New York law, the Nassau 
County Police Department is considered an administra-
tive arm of the County, without a legal identity separate 
and apart from the municipality and, therefore, without 
the capacity to sue or be sued."). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' 
claims against the Nassau County Police Department are 
dismissed. 
II. Statute of Limitations 
Defendants argue that under Wallace v. Kato, 549 
US. 384, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 166 L. Ed. 2d 973 (2007), 
Wharton's [*9] § 1983 false arrest claim is barred by 
New York's three-year statute of limitations. See Preston 
v. New York, 223 F Supp. 2d452, 467 (S.D.NY. 2002) 
(§ 1983 actions brought in New York have a three-year 
statute of limitations). In Wallace, the Supreme Court 
held "that the statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim 
seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by 
criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the 
claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process." 
Wallace, 549 US. at 397. This decision constrained the 
scope of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 US. 477, 114 S. Ct. 
2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), wherein the Supreme 
Court previously held that a § 1983 action does not and 
cannot ripen "unless and until the conviction or sentence 
is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned." Heck, 
512 U.S. at 489. Thus, under Heck, the clock for a false 
arrest claim started not upon arrest, but only upon favor-
able disposition of the underlying charges. Wallace mod-
ified what courts had come to refer to as the "Heck bar," 
by clarifying that Heck applies only where the § 198.3 
claim could invalidate an existing conviction. Anticipat-
ed future convictions, however, do not [*10] bar the 
accrual of a false arrest claim, which arises once the vic-
tim "becomes held pursuant to such process — when, for 
example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned 
on charges." Wallace, 549 US. at 389 (emphasis in 
original). 
Applying the Wallace rationale in this case, Plain-
tiffs' § 1983 false arrest claim accrued on January 21, 
2004 when Wharton was issued a desk appearance ticket 
and released from police custody and expired three years 
later on January 21, 2007. See Weir v. City of New York, 
No. 05 Civ. 9268, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61542, 2008 
WL 3363129, at *10 (S.D.NY. Aug. 11, 2008) (plaintiffs 
§ 1983 false arrest claim accrued when he was given the 
desk appearance ticket and released from the station-
house). In this case, Plaintiffs did not file this action until 
May 24, 2007, over three years and four months later. 
Because Wallace applies retroactively, see Mallard v. 
Potenza, No. 08-cv-0455, F.3d , 376 Fed Appx. 
132, 2010 US. App. LEXIS 9683, 2010 WL 1879044, at 
*1 (2d Cir. May 12, 2010) (noting that the holding in 
Wallace itself indicates its retroactivity), Defendants 
contend that Plaintiffs' false arrest claim is time-barred. 
Plaintiffs appeal to principles of equity, arguing that if 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment were [*11] 
granted on statute of limitations grounds, Wharton would 
be "unfairly penalized for following the Second Circuit 
law as it existed in 2004" and "essentially be put in a 
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position where he could never seek the redress that other 
similarly situated individuals have pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983." PL Opp. at 6. This Court agrees. 
Pre-Wallace, the law in this Circuit required that a § 
1983 plaintiff alleging false arrest "pursue [his] criminal 
case to an acquittal or an unqualified dismissal, or else 
waive his section 1983 claim." Roesch v. Otarola, 980 
F.2d 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1992). In Covington v. New York 
111 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit reiter-
ated that if "success on a § 1983 claim would necessarily 
imply the invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal 
prosecution, such a claim does not accrue so long as the 
potential for a judgment in the pending criminal prosecu-
tion continues to exist." Id at 124. Following this prece-
dent, if Plaintiffs brought a false arrest claim prior to 
April 24, 2006, it would have created the "distinct possi-
bility of an inconsistent result" in Wharton's parallel 
criminal case. However, following the Wallace decision 
issued on February 21, [*12] 2007, Plaintiffs' false ar-
rest claim, which otherwise would have been viable, in-
stantaneously became untimely. 
In Eargroves v. City of New York, 694 F. Supp. 2d 
198 (E.D.N Y. 2010), this Court was faced with a similar 
scenario. In that case, also sounding in false arrest, plain-
tiffs were arraigned in late March 1998, convicted in 
2000, and acquitted in 2002; however, they did not bring 
suit until 2003. Although under Wallace, plaintiffs' limi-
tations period expired in March of 2001, this Court held 
that equitable tolling should be applied where a change 
in law retroactively time-barred a claim that was timely 
when filed. Id. at 211. This Court reasoned that the 
plaintiffs, having filed their complaint within a year of 
obtaining a favorable termination of the criminal charg-
es, exercised reasonable diligence in pursuit of their 
claims, and that the "still-years-away change in law," 
which the Plaintiffs could not have predicted, constituted 
the type of "extraordinary circumstances" that justify the 
application of equitable tolling. Id. 
For the same reasons announced in Hargroves, 
Plaintiffs in this case are entitled to equitable tolling on 
their § 1983 false arrest claim. Plaintiffs, through [*13] 
no fault of their own, relied on then-authoritative Second 
Circuit precedent to their detriment, and strict application 
of Wallace would effectively deprive Plaintiffs of their 
cause of action. See Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 
2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (equitably tolling plaintiffs' 
false arrest claim in light of the change in law occasioned 
by Wallace). Moreover, Plaintiffs have acted with rea-
sonable diligence to pursue their claims. Plaintiffs filed 
suit within thirteen months of obtaining a favorable ter-
mination, and while they had approximately ten months 
after Wharton's acquittal where the claim would have 
been timely even under Wallace, they could no better 
predict the upcoming change in law than the Hargroves 
plaintiffs. Finally, although Plaintiffs waited approxi-
mately three months after the Wallace decision to file 
their claim, this short delay is insufficient to diminish the 
extraordinary circumstance for which equitable tolling 
now applies. Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiffs' 
§ 1983 false arrest claim is timely. 
III. False Arrest 
The elements of a false arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 are "substantially the same" as the elements of a 
false arrest claim [*14] under New York law.3 Posr v. 
Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1991). To establish a 
claim for false arrest under New York law, a plaintiff 
must show that (1) defendant intended to confine plain-
tiff, (2) plaintiff was conscious of confinement, (3) plain-
tiff did not consent to confinement, and (4) confinement 
was not otherwise privileged. Singer v. Fulton Cnty. 
Sheriff, 63 F3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Broughton v. State of New York, 37NY2d451, 456, 335 
NE.2d310, 373NYS.2d87 (1975)). 
3 Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges "false arrest" 
and "false imprisonment." These terms are 
"largely synonymous because an imprisonment 
starts at the moment of arrest." Jenkins v. City of 
New York, 478 F.3d 76, 88 n.10 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(citing reference omitted). Therefore, the Court's 
finding with regard to one equally applies to the 
other. 
"The existence of probable cause to arrest consti-
tutes justification and is a complete defense to an action 
for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state 
law or under § 1983." Weyant v. Okst, 101 F3d 845, 852 
(2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Decker v. Campus, 981 F. Supp. 851, 856 (S.D.NY. 
1996) ("If there existed probable cause at the time of the 
[*15] arrest, the arrest is 'privileged,' and the individual 
has no constitutional or statutory claim against the of-
ficer who made the arrest."). "Probable cause is estab-
lished when the arresting officer has knowledge or rea-
sonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a 
person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense 
has been committed by the person to be arrested." Sing-
er, 63 F.3d at 118-19 (citing reference omitted). In de-
termining whether probable cause existed for Wharton's 
arrest, the Court must consider the 'totality of the cir-
cumstances" in light of the facts known to Kouril and 
DeCaro at the time of the arrest. See Jenkins v. City of 
New York, 478 F.3d 76, 90 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[p]robable 
cause is, of course, evaluated on the totality of the cir-
cumstances"); see also Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 
82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding officers acted 
reasonably considering only those facts that were actual-
ly available or could reasonably have been perceived by 
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them, at the moment they engaged in the challenged 
conduct). 
Here, Wharton was charged with five offenses aris-
ing out of the incident at the Dunkin' Donuts: obstructing 
governmental administration, N.Y. Pen. L. § 195.05; 
[*16] disorderly conduct, N.Y. Pen. L. § 240.20(1), (3)y 
and (7); and resisting arrest, N.Y. Pen. L. § 205.30. De-
fendants argue that they had probable cause to arrest 
Wharton for each of these offenses and seek judgment as 
a matter of law. Upon a careful review of the record, 
however, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plain-
tiffs" favor, as this Court must, it is evident that substan-
tial disputes of material fact preclude summary disposi-
tion of these issues. 
With respect to the charge of obstructing govern-
mental administration, Kouril claims that Wharton inter-
fered with their investigation by "intimidating his two 
friends and attempting to intimidate us by telling [his 
friends] not to talk to us. Telling them fuck them, this is 
[my] hood, he doesn't talk to niggers." Kouril Dep. at 
109. Similarly, DeCaro states that "[w]e were trying to 
conduct an interview of two individuals who at the time 
of our interview we believed were unrelated to the indi-
vidual behind me who started yelling, screaming, you 
know, basically instructed them not to talk to us." 
DeCaro Dep. at 49. However, Wharton testified that up-
on seeing two men question his friends, he merely asked 
what was going [*17] on. Additionally, Wharton states 
that when the officers requested his identification, he 
simply walked away. Viewing these facts in the light 
most favorable to the non-movant, the Court cannot con-
clude as a matter of law that the officers had probable 
cause to arrest Wharton for obstructing governmental 
administration. 
Similarly, disputed issues of material fact preclude a 
finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest 
Wharton for disorderly conduct. According to the offic-
ers, Wharton was creating a disturbance at Dunkin' Do-
nuts by screaming, cursing and using obscenities such as 
"fuck" and "nigger," and that patrons were becoming 
scared and leaving. However, Wharton denies acting this 
way or using the word "nigger." He does admit raising 
his voice and stating, "Fuck that. I'm not talking to you"; 
however, the record is far from clear that he did so with 
the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm or recklessly created such a risk. See N. Y. Pen. L. § 
240.20 ("A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, 
with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof). Additional-
ly, Wharton denies pushing the table into [*18] Kouril 
and neither the Dunkin' Donuts employee witnesses who 
testified during Wharton's state court criminal trial nor 
the Dunkin' Donuts video footage support the officers' 
version of events. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude 
as a matter of law that Kouril and DeCaro held probable 
cause to arrest Wharton for disorderly conduct. 
Finally, with respect to the resisting arrest charge, 
Kouril and DeCaro testified that as they attempted to 
handcuff Wharton, he fought back. They state that 
Wharton tried to pull away, flailed his arms, shrugged his 
shoulders, kicked his feet, and screamed fuck these nig-
gers. However, Wharton insists that he did not fight 
back. Additionally, the video footage on this issue is 
inconclusive. Thus, the record contains disputed issues of 
fact as to whether Wharton resisted arrest. In any event, 
to be guilty of the offense of resisting arrest, one must 
resist an "authorized arrest." N.Y. Pen. L. §205.30. Since 
there are issues of fact as to whether Defendants had 
probable cause to arrest Wharton, Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' § 1983 false arrest 
claim is denied. 
IV. Malicious Prosecution 
Plaintiffs allege that Wharton was maliciously pros-
ecuted [*19] in violation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 and New York State law. The elements of a mali-
cious prosecution under New York law are: "(1) that the 
defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceed-
ing against him; (2) that the proceeding was terminated 
in the plaintiffs favor; (3) that there was no probable 
cause for the proceeding; and (4) that the proceeding was 
instituted with malice." Droz v. McCadden, 580 F.3d 
106, 109 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Kinzer v. Jackson, 316 
F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2003)). In order to establish a 
malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983, a 
plaintiff must assert, in addition to the elements of a ma-
licious prosecution claim under state law, that there was 
"a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to impli-
cate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights." Rohman v. 
New York City Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' § 1983 malicious 
prosecution claim must be dismissed because Wharton's 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from arbitrary sei-
zures was not implicated. However, conditions of pretrial 
release that limit travel or require repeated court appear-
ances can constitute seizures within the meaning [*20] 
of the Fourth Amendment and are sufficient deprivations 
of freedom to sustain a § 1983 malicious prosecution 
claim. See Rohman, 215 F.3d at 216 (finding that re-
pealed court appearances and requirement that Plaintiff 
"must render himself at all times amenable to the orders 
and processes of the court" demonstrated the requisite 
post-arraignment restraint); see also Murphy v. Lynn, 118 
F. 3d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1997). In the instant case, Whar-
ton was required to appear for court on sixteen separate 
occasions, including two days of trial. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs have demonstrated a sufficient 
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post-arraignment deprivation of liberty to support their 
malicious prosecution claim. 
As to the remaining elements of a viable malicious 
prosecution claim, namely the absence of probable cause 
and malice, the Court, for the reasons discussed above, 
finds genuine issues of material fact sufficient to pre-
clude summary judgment. 
Specifically, Wharton's behavior and demeanor in 
the Dunkin' Donuts prior to his arrest is vigorously dis-
puted. Resolution by a jury of that issue is central to the 
question of probable cause. The contested probable cause 
issue also informs the malice element, as malice can be 
inferred [*21] from the absence of probable cause. Ac-
cordingly, a reasonable jury could credit Wharton and 
find that each malicious prosecution element - the com-
mencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding, a 
favorable termination, the lack of probable cause, malice, 
and a post-arraignment liberty restraint - has been satis-
fied. Defendants" motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs' § 1983 and New York State law malicious 
prosecution claims is therefore denied. 
V. Qualified Immunity 
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields govern-
ment officials from civil liability, but only where their 
"conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 
102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed 2d 396 (1982). Specifically, 
qualified immunity exists where (1) it was objectively 
reasonable for the officer to believe there was probable 
cause to make the arrest, or (2) reasonably competent 
police officers could disagree as to whether there was 
probable cause to arrest. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 
154(2dCir. 2007). 
In favor of qualified immunity. Defendants argue 
that Kouril and DeCaro reasonably believed that there 
was probable cause to arrest [*22] Wharton based on 
the report of a disturbance as well as their observations 
and interactions inside the Dunkin' Donuts. As deter-
mined above, however, the events leading up to Whar-
ton's arrest present genuine issues of material fact, and 
shall remain for jury determination. As such, qualified 
immunity as to Kouril and DeCaro cannot be resolved as 
a matter of law. 
However, this Court concludes that Defendant 
McGovern is entitled to qualified immunity because he 
reasonably believed that the information he received 
from Kouril and DeCaro was sufficient to charge Whar-
ton with the crimes for which he was arrested. The rec-
ord reflects that McGovern did not directly participate in 
Wharton's arrest, and although he drew up the charges 
against Wharton, he did so based on the accounts of 
Kouril and DeCaro. At that time, McGovern had no rea-
son to disbelieve his fellow officers and he was entitled 
to rely on their determination that probable cause existed 
to arrest Wharton. See Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271 
(2d Cir. 2002) (finding that officer was entitled to quali-
fied immunity where he did not witness any unlawful 
activity and reasonably relied on his fellow officer's de-
termination that the arrest [*23] was lawful). Accord-
ingly, McGovern is entitled to qualified immunity, and 
Plaintiffs' claims against him are dismissed. 
VI. Municipal Liability 
Plaintiffs claim that the County failed to properly 
train its officers in determining the lawfulness of an ar-
rest. To hold a municipality liable under § 1983, the 
plaintiff must first prove (a) the existence of a municipal 
policy or custom in order to show that the municipality 
took some action that caused injury and (b) a causal 
connection—an 'affirmative link'-between the policy and 
the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Monell v. 
Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 
56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); Vippolis v. Village of Haver-
straw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 480 
US. 916, 107 S. Ct. 1369, 94 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1987). 
Although lack of training can provide a basis for 
municipal liability, see City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 
489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 
412 (1989), Plaintiffs in this case have not presented any 
testimony from supervisory or training officers, training 
instruction materials, in-service memoranda, or legal 
bulletins sufficient to suggest the existence of the requi-
site municipal policy, custom or practice. 4 To the con-
trary, Plaintiffs rely solely on the testimony of Kouril, 
[*24] DeCaro and McGovern; however, nothing in their 
testimony suggests that the County failed to properly 
train its officers. In fact, Kouril, DeCaro and McGovern 
all testified that they were trained at the Nassau County 
Police Department and that they frequently receive legal 
bulletins and are provided with additional training op-
portunities. Moreover, Plaintiffs offer nothing more than 
naked allegations that the training opportunities provided 
are substantially deficient or in any other way inade-
quate. 
4 Plaintiffs state that Defendants have "failed 
to produce any witnesses with regard to how the-
se officers were trained, any training materials, 
in-service memorandums or legal bulletins in re-
sponse to Plaintiffs demands." However, Plain-
tiffs failed to raise this objection during discov-
ery, and have not demonstrated by affidavit, 
"that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts 
essential to justify [their] opposition." See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(f). As discovery has been closed for 
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over a year and a half, Plaintiffs' request to reo-
pen discovery is denied. 
Thus, based on a careful examination of the sum-
mary judgment record, this Court finds that no reasona-
ble factfinder could conclude that [*25] the County of 
Nassau failed to properly train its officers. Plaintiffs' 
municipal liability claim is therefore dismissed.5 
5 Defendants also request that Plaintiffs' claims 
for punitive damages against the County of Nas-
sau be dismissed. Defendants' request is granted. 
See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 
U.S. 247, 259-63, 101 S Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed 2d 
616 (1981) (holding that a municipality is im-
mune from punitive damages under § 1983). 
However, to the extent that Defendants seek dis-
missal of Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages 
against the individual defendants, that request is 
denied. See New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance 
Corps, Inc. v. Meyers, 442 F.3d 101, 122 (2dCir. 
2006) ("[although a municipality itself is im-
mune from a claim for punitive damages, that 
immunity does not extend to a municipal official 
sued in his individual capacity") (omitting inter-
nal citations). 
VII. Equal Protection Claim 
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plain-
tiffs' equal protection claim. 6 The Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that "no State shall ... deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws." U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1. "To [*26] 
state a race-based claim under the Equal Protection 
Clause, a plaintiff must allege that a government actor 
intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of 
his race." Brown v. City ofOneonta, New York, 221 F.3d 
329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000). Intentional discrimination can 
be demonstrated in several ways. 
First, a law or policy is discriminatory 
on its face if it expressly classifies persons 
on the basis of race or gender. In addition, 
a law which is facially neutral violates 
equal protection if it is applied in a dis-
criminatory fashion. Lastly, a facially 
neutral statute violates equal protection if 
it was motivated by discriminatory ani-
mus and its application results in a dis-
criminatory effect. 
Hoyden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 
1999) (internal citations omitted). 
6 Plaintiffs' Complaint does not expressly state 
an equal protection claim. They raise this cause 
of action for the first time in their opposition to 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. On 
this basis alone, Plaintiffs' equal protection claim 
is dismissed. See Casseus v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 
No. 08-CV-4119, 722 F. Supp. 2d 326, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 68910, 2010 WL 2736935, at * 14 
(E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2010) (citing cases) (a plaintiff 
may not raise new claims [*27] in his opposi-
tion to a summary judgment motion). 
Here, Plaintiffs argue that Wharton was arrested 
pursuant to facially neutral statutes because of his race 
and age.7 They claim that the officers' investigation was 
motivated solely by unlawful race and age discrimina-
tion. However, that allegation is belied by the record, 
which reflects that Kouril and DeCaro questioned 
McGuad, Snowden and Wharton because they believed 
these individuals were the same teenagers they had ob-
served earlier walking away from Mineola High School 
at the same time they received the report of a disturbance 
at the school, and because they matched the descriptions 
of several black teenagers that had been ejected from the 
school. In sum, there is no evidence in the record to sug-
gest that Defendants discriminated against Wharton 
based on his race or age. See Pyke v. Cuomo, 258 F3d 
107, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that a plaintiff who al-
leges that a facially neutral law or policy has been ap-
plied in an intentionally discriminatory race-based man-
ner is not obligated to show a better treated, similarly 
situated group of individuals of a different race in order 
to establish a claim of denial of equal protection, but 
[*28] must still proffer evidence that defendants were 
motivated by discrimination); see also Rivera-Powell v. 
New York City Bd. of Elections, 470 F3d 458, 470 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (conclusory allegations are insufficient to 
establish discrimination). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' equal 
protection claim is dismissed. 
7 Plaintiffs concede that they have not pre-
sented evidence that similarly situated individuals 
were treated differently than him. They state, 
"[ijndeed, it would be impossible . . . to demon-
strate that white high school students were not 
arrested and charged for using Constitutionally 
First Amendment protected language in retalia-
tion for using language which the police officers 
did not like." PI. Opp. at 12. 
VIII. Excessive Force 
Plaintiffs allege that Kouril and DeCaro used exces-
sive force in effectuating Wharton's arrest. As previously 
stated, federal claims arising under § 1983 have a 
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three-year statute of limitations. A claim for excessive 
force accrues when, the use of force occurred. Singleton 
v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980). In 
this action, Plaintiffs' claim for excessive force arose on 
January 20, 2004, the date of Wharton's arrest. However, 
Plaintiffs did not [*29] bring suit until May 24, 2007, 
over three years later. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' excessive 
force claim is dismissed as time-barred.8 
8 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' federal 
claims are time-barred; however, they do not 
specifically address Plaintiffs' excessive force 
claim. To the extent that Defendants' do not chal-
lenge this claim, the Court finds that a sua sponte 
dismissal under § 1983 "based on the statute of 
limitations is especially appropriate where, as in 
this case, the injuries complained of occurred 
more than [three] years before the filing of the 
complaint-well outside the applicable three-year 
limitations period, there are no applicable tolling 
provisions as a matter of law, and plaintiffs have 
alleged no facts indicating a continuous or ongo-
ing violation of his constitutional rights." Owens 
v. Harris, No. 94 Civ. 5968, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9952, 1996 WL 399806, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 16, 1996) (quoting Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51 
(2dCir. 1995)). 
IX. State Law Claims 
a. False Arrest 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' false arrest claim 
under New York State law must be dismissed as 
time-barred. Under New York General Municipal Law, 
an aggrieved individual is required to submit a notice of 
claim within ninety [*30] days after the state law claim 
arises and bring suit within one year and ninety-days 
"after the happening of the event upon which the claim is 
based." NY Gen. L. §§ 50-e(l)(a) and 50-i(l). Here, 
Plaintiffs state law false arrest claim accrued on January 
21, 2004. 9 However, since Plaintiffs did not file their 
notice of claim until July 21, 2006., over two years later, 
and did not bring suit until May 24, 2007, over three 
years later, Plaintiffs' state law false arrest claim is dis-
missed as untimely under N Y. Gen. L. §§ 50-e(l)(a) and 
50-i(l).,0 
9 Unlike federal law, which underwent a great 
deal of flux and uncertainty in light of Heck and 
Wallace, New York State law false arrest claims 
have consistently been deemed to accrue imme-
diately upon the plaintiffs release from confine-
ment. See Hill v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 
9473, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56454, 2006 WL 
2347739, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug., 14, 2006) (reject-
ing plaintiffs assertion that a state law false arrest 
claim does not accrue until the criminal matter is 
terminated); see also Roche v. Village of Tar-
rytown, 309 A.D2d 842, 766 NYS.2d 46 (2d 
Dep't2003). 
10 To the extent that Plaintiff raises an exces-
sive force claim pursuant to New York State law, 
that claim must [*31] also be dismissed at 
time-barred under NY. Gen. L §§ 50-e(l)(a) and 
50-i(l). 
b. Malicious Prosecution 
With respect to Plaintiffs New York State malicious 
prosecution claim, "federal and state courts have applied 
the statute of limitations for intentional torts against a 
municipality with conflicting results." Lieber v. Village 
of Spring Valley, 40 F. Supp. 2d 525, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). This inconsistency arises because the statute of 
limitations under NY. C.P.L.R. § 215(3) for a claim of 
malicious prosecution is one year while the statute of 
limitations under N Y. Gen. L. § 50-i(l) is one year and 
ninety-days. " In resolving this discrepancy, many of our 
sister courts have concluded that the one year and nine-
ty-day limitations period under NY. Gen. L. § 50-i(l) 
applies to lawsuits brought against a municipality and its 
employees acting within the scope and duty of their em-
ployment. See Niles v. City of Oneida, No. 
6:06-CV-1492, 2009 US Dist. LEXIS 24933, 2009 WL 
799971, at *5 (N.D.N. Y. Mar. 25, 2009) (citing cases). 
After a careful review of the applicable statutes and the 
relevant case law on this issue, this Court concludes that 
the one year and ninety-day statute of limitations under 
NY Gen. L. § 50-i(l) [*32] applies to Plaintiffs state 
law malicious prosecution claim brought against the 
County of Nassau and its empl oyees. Since Plaintiffs 
brought suit within this timeframe, their state law mali-
cious prosecution claim is timely. Accordingly, Defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment as to this claim is 
denied. 
11 In this action, Plaintiffs state law malicious 
prosecution claim would be timely under NY. 
Gen. L. § 50-i(l) but untimely under NY. 
C.P.L.R. §215(3). 
c. Negligence 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were negligent in 
effectuating Wharton's arrest and in prosecuting him. 
However, "a plaintiff may not recover under general 
negligence principles for a claim that a defendant failed 
to exercise the appropriate degree of care in effecting an 
arrest or initiating a prosecution." Coakley v. Jaffe, 49 F. 
Supp. 2d 615, 629 (S.D.N.Y 1999). Moreover, Plaintiffs 
failed to file a notice of claim with the County of Nassau 
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or commence this action within the time periods pre-
scribed under N. Y. Gen, L. §§ 50-e and 50-/. See Martin 
v. Cnty. of Nassau, 692 F. Supp. 2d 282, 290 (RD.N.Y. 
2010) (dismissing state law claims as untimely). Ac-
cordingly, Plaintiffs' negligence claim is dismissed. 
X. Plaintiffs' [*33] Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment on 
their false arrest, malicious prosecution, and municipal 
liability claims. Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment 
dismissing Defendants' qualified immunity defense. 
However, as discussed above, numerous disputes of ma-
terial fact preclude summary judgment. Therefore, Plain-
tiffs' cross-motion is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is grant-
ed in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' cross-motion 
for summary judgment is denied in its entirety. The 
Court makes the following rulings: 
1. Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment as to Plaintiffs' New York State 
law false arrest claim, § 1983 and New 
York State law excessive force claims, 
municipal liability claim, equal protection 
claim, and negligence claim is GRANT-
ED; 
2. Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment as to the Nassau County Police 
Department is GRANTED; 
3. Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims against 
McGovern based on qualified immunity is 
GRANTED; 
4. Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment as to Plaintiffs' § 1983 false ar-
rest claim and § 1983 and New York State 
law malicious prosecution claims is DE-
NIED; 
5. Plaintiffs' [*34] cross-motion for 
summary judgment is DENIED in its en-
tirety; 
The case is recommitted to the assigned Magistrate 
Judge for settlement discussions and remaining pretrial 
issues, and if necessary, the preparation of a joint pretrial 
order. 
SO ORDERED. 
Dated: Brooklyn, New York 
September 20, 2010 
/s/RRM 
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF 
United States District Judge 
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OPINION 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
This case is presently before the Court on Defend-
ants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 2), which motion is ripe 
for consideration. For the reasons that follow, Defend-
ants* motion will be DENIED as to Plaintiffs § 1983 
claims and DENIED as to Plaintiffs state-law claims, 
with the exception of his claim for libel and slander. 
I. Background 
This civil action arises from Plaintiff Kenneth Ken-
nedy's arrest for disorderly conduct by Defendant Joseph 
Schutzman while Kennedy was at the Villa Hills City 
Building on May 18, 2005. While those criminal charges 
were pending, Kennedy filed a civil suit against the City 
of Villa Hills and Schutzman, in his individual and offi-
cial capacities, on May 8, 2006, in the Kenton Circuit 
Court. * That case was removed to this Court pursuant 
[*2] to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, on the basis that Plaintiffs civil 
rights claims provided federal question jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, et 
al, Cov. Case No. 06-cv-l 12. Defendants then moved to 
dismiss Plaintiffs cause of action as premature, in light 
of the pending criminal prosecution. Defendants' motion 
was granted by Memorandum Order of October 16, 
2006, with Plaintiffs Complaint being dismissed without 
prejudice. See Id. (Doc. # 8). 
1 That Complaint alleged that Schutzman is the 
Zoning Administrator/Building Code Enforce-
ment Officer/Building Inspector for the City of 
Villa Hills, as well as its City Police Detective. 
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The disorderly conduct charge against Plaintiff was 
dismissed by the state district court judge on June 19, 
2007, after Defendants refused to certify to the Kentucky 
Attorney General the issue of whether a city police de-
tective can be employed as both a police officer and as a 
city building inspector. The criminal proceedings having 
concluded, Kennedy filed a new complaint on July 6, 
2007, again in the Kenton Circuit Court. But for the up-
date in procedural history via newly-added paragraph 13, 
the content of this second filing is a [*3] mirror image 
of the first. And as was done with the first action, De-
fendants removed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, 
based upon federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. 2 Defendants once again move to dismiss, this 
time arguing that Plaintiffs claims are now time-barred. 
2 Both Complaints assert various imprecise 
claims under four "Cause of Action" headings. 
The first two causes of action allege federal 
claims. First Cause of Action - a § 1983 claim 
against the City of Villa Hills for failure to 
properly train and supervise its police officers 
and formulate adequate policies to prevent un-
lawful harassment, false arrest, and false impris-
onment in violation of Plaintiffs civil rights and 
his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Ken-
tucky Constitution. Second Cause of Action - a § 
1983 claim against Defendant Schutzman, and 
other Unknown Defendants, for conspiring to 
harass and intimidate Plaintiff, thereby depriving 
him of his constitutional rights by threats of 
physical arrest, false imprisonment, force and re-
taliation. 
The last two causes of action assert state-law 
claims. Third Cause of Action — claims against 
the City [*4] and Schutzman for "falsely and 
maliciously prosecuting and imprisoning him and 
charging him with a misdemeanor crime and oth-
er offenses, which was an intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, without proper investigation 
and without regard to the truth of the situation 
and the facts as known to all defendants," to pun-
ish and retaliate against Plaintiff for prior com-
plaints and inquiries he had presented to the City 
in conjunction with zoning matters. Fourth Cause 
of Action — claims against the City and Schutz-
man for "libeling and slandering him by giving 
and swearing to false testimony" that Plaintiff 
was a disorderly person, and thereby abusing 
process, again to punish and retaliate against him 
for his prior complaints and inquiries. 
II. Analysis 
A. Prior Dismissal of Kennedy's Claims as Prema-
ture 
This Court, on motion of Defendants, dismissed 
Plaintiffs initial Complaint filed in May of 2006. The 
Court concluded that dismissal of Plaintiffs § 1983 con-
stitutional tort claims for monetary damages pending 
prosecution of Kennedy on the underlying criminal 
charges upon which the federal civil claims were based 
was compelled by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 
S Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994). 
Petitioner in Heck [*5] was convicted of man-
slaughter. While his direct appeal of his criminal convic-
tion was pending, he filed a civil complaint alleging a § 
1983 claim of malicious prosecution based upon the acts 
and omissions of the investigator and prosecutors in-
volved in his criminal conviction. The Supreme Court 
expressed concern about criminal defendants using civil 
rights suits for monetary damages as a means to collater-
ally attack their criminal judgments. The Court set cer-
tain conditions that limit pursuit of § 1983 claims to situ-
ations where proof of the civil claim will not impact or 
disturb the criminal judgment, or the criminal judgment 
has already been reversed or vacated. 
We hold that, in order to recover dam-
ages for allegedly unconstitutional con-
viction or imprisonment, or for other harm 
caused by actions whose unlawfulness 
would render a conviction or sentence in-
valid, [ ] a § 1983 plaintiff must prove 
that the conviction or sentence has been 
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 
executive order, declared invalid by a 
state tribunal authorized to make such de-
termination, or called into question by a 
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus, 28 U.S.C § 2254. A claim for 
damages [*6] bearing that relationship to 
a conviction or sentence that has not been 
so invalidated is not cognizable under § 
1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks 
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district 
court must consider whether a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of his 
conviction or sentence; if it would, the 
complaint must be dismissed unless the 
plaintiff can demonstrate that the con-
viction or sentence has already been 
invalidated. But if the district court de-
termines that the plaintiffs action, even 
if successful, will not demonstrate the 
invalidity of any outstanding criminal 
judgment against the plaintiff, the ac-
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tion should be allowed to proceed,[ ] in 
the absence of some other bar to the suit.[ 
] 
Id. at 487 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).3 
3 The Court's holding in Heck, that a civil 
complaint based on underlying criminal proceed-
ings must be dismissed if a judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff would imply the invalidity of his 
conviction, is commonly referred to by courts as 
"the Heck bar." 
The § 1983 filing in Heck is procedurally distin-
guishable from Kennedy's first § 1983 filing. In Heck the 
civil suit was presented post-conviction, with appeal 
[*7] pending. Kennedy's initial Complaint here was filed 
while the disorderly conduct charges were still pending 
against him. Nevertheless, and as Defendants expressly 
argued in that earlier dismissal motion, the Sixth Circuit 
had adopted the Heck rationale and extended it to the 
pre-conviction context in Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 
F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 1999), wherein the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that it would not have been possible to rule on 
plaintiffs § 1983 claim for illegal search in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment without deciding issues common 
to, and thereby infringing upon, the pending criminal 
action, such as the legality of the searches. Id. at 398. 4 
Since applying the Heck bar pre-conviction meant 
Shamaeizadeh could not bring his § 1983 claim until the 
criminal charges against him concluded (they were ulti-
mately dismissed), the Sixth Circuit held that "the proper 
starting point for the running of the statute of limitations 
is the date of the dismissal of the criminal charges." 
Shamaeizadeh 182 F.3d at 399. 
4 In so concluding, the Sixth Circuit looked to 
the Third Circuit's reasoning in Smith v. Holtz, 87 
F3dl08(3dCir. 1996): 
We find that these concerns, 
[from Heck] apply [*8] equally 
to claims that, if successful, would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of 
a future conviction on a pending 
criminal charge. A claim by a de-
fendant in an ongoing criminal 
prosecution which necessarily 
challenges the legality of a future 
conviction on a pending criminal 
charge lies at the intersection of 
the federal habeas corpus statute 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
If such a claim could proceed 
while criminal proceedings are 
ongoing, there would be a poten-
tial for inconsistent determinations 
in the civil and criminal cases and 
the criminal defendant would be 
able to collaterally attack the 
prosecution in a civil suit. In terms 
of the conflicts which Heck sought 
to avoid, there is no difference 
between a conviction which is 
outstanding at the/time the civil 
rights action is instituted and a 
potential conviction on a pending 
charge that may be entered at 
some point thereafter. 
Shamaeizadeh, 182 F3d at 397-98 (quoting 
Smith,87F.3datll3n.5). 
In ruling on Kennedy's original complaint removed 
here in 2006, this Court determined that, although his § 
1983 claims as asserted were not a model of clarity, De-
fendants persuasively argued that each of those claims 
regardless of the [*9] label turned upon the issue of the 
legitimacy of Kennedy's arrest for disorderly conduct. 5 
The Court determined that "[ajccording to the scope of 
the claims as set forth by Plaintiff, the resolution of the 
disorderly conduct charge in state court is effectively a 
threshold condition for the legitimate survival of Plain-
tiffs [federal] civil claims based thereon." Kennedy v. 
City of Villa Hills, et al., Cov. Case No. 06-cv-l 12 (Doc. 
# 8, at p. 4). Therefore, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs 
claims without prejudice pursuant to Heck and 
Shamaeizadeh, indicating Plaintiff would have the op-
portunity to refile the alleged constitutional violations 
assuming a favorable outcome in his criminal proceed-
ings.6 
5 Plaintiff asserts both federal and state claims, 
but this discussion is directed to the federal 
claims only. The state law claims are addressed 
separately in this opinion. 
6 Plaintiff noted his concern about the possibil-
ity of a future statute of limitations challenge if 
he refiled his claims upon conclusion of the 
criminal proceedings. The Court pointed out that, 
pursuant to Shamaeizadeh, Plaintiffs federal 
causes of action accrue, if at all, only upon ter-
mination of those state criminal [* 10] charges in 
his favor. His causes of action otherwise do not 
exist, and the statute of limitations does not begin 
to run, until such time. See Kennedy v. City of 
Villa Hills, et al, Cov. Case No. 06-cv-122 (Doc. 
# 8, at n.6 & accompanying text). 
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While this holding in Shamaeizadeh con-
cerning when the statute of limitations begins to 
run was derived in part from an expansion of 
Heck, the Supreme Court in Heck expressly noted 
that the statute of limitations was not at issue be-
cause there is "no cause of action under § 1983 
unless and until the conviction or sentence is re-
versed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by 
the grant of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 
U.S. at 489. Commonly referred to as deferred 
accrual, the Court held that "a § 1983 cause of 
action for damages attributable to an unconstitu-
tional conviction or sentence does not accrue un-
til the conviction or sentence has been invalidat-
ed."/^/. 
B. Current Requested Dismissal of Kennedy's 
Claims as Untimely 
Although Defendants previously asserted Plaintiffs 
claims were premature, they now denounce them as un-
timely based upon the Supreme Court's "reversed 
course," in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 127 S. Ct. 
1091, 166 L. Ed 2d 973 (2007), a decision issued [* 11] 
after to the prior dismissal of Kennedy's claims. In Wal-
lace, the Supreme Court held that "the accrual date of a § 
1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is 
not resolved by reference to state law," id. at 1095, and 
"[t]he statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking 
damages for a false arrest 7 in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal 
proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant be-
comes detained pursuant to legal process," id. at 1100. 
1 In Wallace, petitioner was arrested and con-
victed of murder in January 1994, but the charges 
were ultimately dropped in April 2002. Thereaf-
ter, petitioner filed claims for both false arrest 
and false imprisonment, but the Court analyzed 
them together as false imprisonment. 
Wallace explains that, in a pre-conviction setting, 
the statute of limitations on § 1983 claims begins to run 
not necessarily when the underlying criminal proceed-
ings conclude, but could begin at an earlier time depend-
ing upon the accrual point of the cause of action for that 
type of constitutional tort. Id. at 1095-96. The particular 
constitutional tort being sued upon in Wallace, false ar-
rest/imprisonment, could be [*12] brought "as soon as 
the allegedly wrongful arrest occurred, subjecting [peti-
tioner] to the harm of involuntary detention," but for a 
common law distinction in false imprisonment cases that 
the limitations period runs when the alleged false im-
prisonment ends. Id. at 1095-96. 
Defendants' analysis of why Plaintiffs federal 
claims are now barred under Wallace is straightforward. 
{See Doc. # 2, at p. 9) Because Plaintiffs suit seeks 
damages "for alleged conduct that resulted in his arrest 
and criminal proceedings being brought against him on 
May 18, 2005," they infer Plaintiffs suit is one for 
wrongful arrest that, under Wallace and the Sixth Cir-
cuit's application of Wallace in Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 
227 (6th Cir. 2007), 8 Plaintiff was required to file suit 
within one year of his arrest,9 therefore time-barring his 
§ 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims refiled 
on July 6, 2007. 
8 In Fox, the Sixth Circuit held that § 1983 
claims for false arrest "accrue at the time of the 
arrest or, at the latest, when detention without le-
gal process ends." Fox, 489 F.3d at 233. 
9 It is well-settled that § 1983§ 1983 claims are 
governed by Kentucky's personal injury statute of 
limitations. "We conclude [*13] that section 
1983 actions in Kentucky are limited by the 
one-year statute of limitations found in section 
413.140(l)(a)r Collar d v. Kentucky Bd of Nurs-
ing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990); see also 
Dixon v. Clem, 492 F3d 665, 671 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
Defendants' argument relies on packaging Plaintiffs 
federal claims into a "wrongful arrest" box so that De-
fendants can claim the time clock began ticking back at 
the time of arrest. The reality is that Plaintiffs claims 
have been poorly identified and pled. The prior dismissal 
order noted that the precise nature of the § 1983 claims 
and the amendments those claims stood upon simply 
were not clear. Defendants never moved in either case 
for a more definite statement of Plaintiffs claims or to 
dismiss the claims for failure to adequately state a claim 
against them. 
In this case, it would be unjust to hold Plaintiffs feet 
to the fire of a federal constitutional "wrongful arrest" 
claim with its companion running date for filing. The 
Court's prior dismissal order noted the "conspicuous ab-
sence of any Fourth Amendment claim" in Plaintiffs 
Complaint, see Case No. 06-cv-l 12 (Doc. # 8, p. 4), yet 
curiously Plaintiff relied upon an exception [*14] to 
Heck in the context of Fourth Amendment claims in 
fighting that prior dismissal motion. In other words, the 
nature and scope of Plaintiffs federal claims is anything 
but obvious, "wrongful arrest" or otherwise. 
Perhaps Defendants did not protest the inartfully 
worded Complaint in their first motion to dismiss be-
cause it was not necessary to separate out each specific § 
1983 claim in order to consider whether the Heck bar 
applied. Whatever the labels on Plaintiffs § 1983 claims, 
they all implied the invalidity of the disorderly conduct 
arrest and detainment, thus requiring dismissal under 
Heck pursuant to the Sixth Circuit's extension of the 
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Heck bar in the pre-conviction context via Shamaeiza-
dek I0 But with the Supreme Court's clarification in 
Wallace that the required dismissal and deferred accrual 
occasioned by Heck do not apply in the pre-conviction 
setting, identifying in precise terms each constitutional 
tort being asserted by a civil rights plaintiff becomes 
critical in determining the accrual date for each § 1983 
claim. 
10 The Sixth Circuit applied Heck's bar to fil-
ing § 1983 claims to the pre-conviction setting, 
reasoning the criminal defendant's focus should 
not be misdirected [*15] to raising potential § 
1983 claims within one year of an alleged consti-
tutional violation, but instead focused on mount-
ing a viable defense to the pending criminal 
charges. And since, if a conviction did occur, the 
claims would have to be dismissed without prej-
udice under Heck as having not yet accrued, it 
made sense to allow criminal defendants to wait 
until pending criminal proceedings had concluded 
to timely file claims, as was done convicted de-
fendants. Shamaeizadeh, 182 F.3d at 399. 
In sum, the Supreme Court has not reversed course 
as Defendants suggest; Wallace does not overturn or 
alter Heck's holding. Rather, it expounds upon the proper 
application of the Heck bar. 
[T]he Heck rule for deferred accrual is 
called into play only when there exists "a 
conviction or sentence that has not been ... 
invalidated," that is to say, an "outstand-
ing criminal judgment." It delays what 
would otherwise be the accrual date of a 
tort action until the setting aside of an ex-
tant conviction which success in that tort 
action would impugn. We assume that, for 
purposes of the present tort action, the 
Heck principle would be applied not to the 
date of accrual but to the date on which 
the statute of limitations [*16] began to 
run, that is, the date petitioner became 
held pursuant to legal process. Even at 
that later time, there was in existence no 
criminal conviction that the cause of ac-
tion would impugn; indeed, there may not 
even have been an indictment. 
Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1098 (emphasis in original). 
However, the Court's clarification in Wallace about 
Heck's application in pre-conviction settings did effec-
tively reverse the course being charted by the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Shamaeizadeh and cases relying upon it. The Su-
preme Court in Wallace declined to adopt petitioner's 
argument that pursuant to Heck, the statute of limitations 
for his alleged § 1983 claim should not have accrued 
until the day his criminal charges were dismissed. Id at 
1097-98. Instead, the Court held that Heck did not create 
a blanket rule that all § 1983 claims are not cognizable 
until dismissal or resolution of criminal charges, deter-
mining the statute of limitations for petitioner's false im-
prisonment claim began to run when he first appeared 
before the Court and was bound over for trial. Id. at 
1097. 
What petitioner seeks, in other words, 
is the adoption of a principle that goes 
well beyond Heck; that an action which 
would [*17] impugn an anticipated fu-
ture conviction cannot be brought until 
that conviction occurs and is set aside. 
The impracticality of such a rule should 
be obvious. In an action for false arrest it 
would require the plaintiff (and if he 
brings suit promptly, the court) to specu-
late about whether a prosecution will be 
brought, whether it will result in convic-
tion, and whether the pending civil action 
will impugn that verdict, see Heck, 512 
U.S., at 487, n.7, 114 S Ct. 2364 - all 
this at a time when it can hardly be known 
what evidence the prosecution has in its 
possession. And what if the plaintiff (or 
the court) guesses wrong, and the antici-
pated future conviction never occurs, be-
cause of acquittal or dismissal? Does that 
event (instead of the //ed>required setting 
aside of the extant conviction) trigger ac-
crual of the cause of action? Or what if 
prosecution never occurs - what will the 
trigger be then? 
We are not disposed to embrace this 
bizarre extension of Heck. If a plaintiff 
files a false arrest claim before he has 
been convicted (or files any other claim 
related to rulings that will likely be made 
in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), 
it is within the power of the district court, 
[*18] and in accord with common prac-
tice, to stay the civil action until the 
criminal case or the likelihood of a crimi-
nal case is ended. See id. [citing Heck, 
512 U.S.] at 478-88, n.8,512 US. 477, 
114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (noting 
that "abstention may be an appropriate 
response to the parallel state-court pro-
ceedings"); . . . . If the plaintiff is ulti-
mately convicted, and if the stayed civil 
suit would impugn that conviction, Heck 
will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil 
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action will proceed, absent some other bar 
to suit. 
Id. at 1098 (internal citations omitted). 
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that "[i]n no un-
certain terms, however, the Court in Wallace clarified 
that the Heck bar has no application in the pre-conviction 
context." Fox, 489 F.3d at 234. To the extent the Sixth 
Circuit in Shamaeizadeh concluded otherwise, that deci-
sion has been abrogated. See Fox, 489 FJd at 233; Edi-
son v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 FJd 631, 
639 (6th Cir. 2007). Wallace now requires that where 
"plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been 
convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that 
will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal 
trial), it is within the power of the district [*19] court, 
and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil 
action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a crim-
inal case is ended." Id. at 1098. Thus, Wallace still 
stands for the principle that courts should refrain from 
considering alleged § 1983 claims where there are pend-
ing or potential state criminal proceedings and resolution 
of the constitutional tort claims would impugn the integ-
rity of a possible future criminal conviction. The differ-
ence, post-Wallace versus pre-Wallace, is that now the 
proper procedure is to stay the action rather than dismiss 
the claims without prejudice pursuant to Heck, which is 
what this Court did in Kennedy's prior action. 
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wallace, 
this Court's previous dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint 
without prejudice pursuant to Heck and Shamaeizadeh 
may " now present statute of limitations problems for 
Plaintiff that this Court in its prior order stated would not 
occur. Yet, there is a critical difference between the case 
now before this Court and the decisions of Wallace and 
Fox. In Wallace and Fox, the plaintiffs did not file their 
civil complaint in the first instance until after their crim-
inal charges had [*20] been dismissed or overturned. 
Plaintiff here did file his initial Complaint while his dis-
orderly conduct charge was still pending. 
11 While it is undisputed that a one-year stat-
ute of limitations applies to each of those claims, 
determining when the claim accrued for purposes 
of when the limitations period begins depends on 
the claim. And, as discussed above, the specific 
federal claims and amendments relied upon 
therefor could hardly be described as being 
clearly stated in Plaintiffs Complaint. Neverthe-
less, given the July 6, 2007, refiling date, any 
claim accruing other than upon dismissal of the 
criminal charges would likely be time-barred. 
The Court is not inclined to unilaterally punish 
Kennedy for circumstances not of his own making. The 
Court ordered Kennedy's claims dismissed as premature 
based on then binding precedent. Plaintiff relied upon the 
Court's directive of when his claims would accrue, and 
that reliance was not misplaced. Under these circum-
stances, application of equitable principles is appropriate 
and has been similarly recognized where a party relied to 
its detriment upon a court's order. See Carlile v. South 
Routt Sch. District RE 3-J, 652 F2d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 
1981) [*21] (court's order upon which plaintiff reason-
ably relied led her to believe she had done everything 
required of her to timely commence suit). To hold oth-
erwise would unfairly prejudice the Plaintiff in this case. 
12 Although Defendants may perceive they are 
being prejudiced by not receiving the benefit of 
this Circuit change in pre-conviction processing 
of § 1983 claims, they never contemplated Plain-
tiffs claims would be dismissed with prejudice 
when the first suit was filed. The only difference 
now is that the claims would have been stayed, 
rather than dismissed. The Court does not view it 
as a prejudice not to bestow upon Defendants the 
windfall of complete dismissal, occasioned solely 
by the timing of Plaintiffs suits. 
Moreover, the Wallace decision also reveals that the 
Supreme Court considered the possibility of a factual 
situation similar to that before this Court, noting the po-
tential harm to a plaintiff that could result. 
Had petitioner filed suit upon his arrest 
and had his suit then been dismissed un-
der Heck, the statute of limitations, absent 
tolling, would have run by the time he 
obtained reversal of his conviction. If un-
der those circumstances he were not al-
lowed to refile [*22] his suit, Heck 
would produce immunity from § 1983 li-
ability, a result surely not intended. Be-
cause in the present case petitioner did not 
file his suit within the limitations period, 
we need not decide, had he done so, how 
much time he would have had to refile the 
suit once the Heck bar was removed. 
Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1099 n. 4. Holding that Plaintiffs 
claims herein are now time-barred post-Wallace by the 
applicable statutes of limitation would result in Heck 
ultimately producing immunity for the Defendants, a 
scenario the Supreme Court deemed unacceptable. 
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At least a few lower courts have also been faced 
with similar quagmires. In Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F, 
Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 2007) the court highlighted 
this note in Wallace as support for its conclusion that 
plaintiffs claims should not be time-barred despite being 
filed outside the statute of limitations. 13 The Kucharski 
court also looked to equitable tolling in saving plaintiffs 
claims from a strict application of Wallace. On the other 
hand, in Sandles v. U.S. Marshal's Service, No. 
04-72426, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94180, 2007 WL 
4374080 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2007) (unpublished deci-
sion), the court declined to apply Wallace's footnote 4 
exception [*23] because the plaintiff had waited ten 
months after his criminal conviction was reversed before 
filing his claims. More importantly, these two cases sig-
nify Wallace considered the possibility that strict appli-
cation of its holding might produce § 1983 immunity 
when civil claims with associated criminal proceedings 
were filed and then dismissed pursuant to Heck, "a result 
surely not intended." Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1099 n.4. 
13 It should be noted that the court in Ku-
charski allowed the plaintiffs claims even though 
they were not filed until after resolution of the 
criminal matter. The court held plaintiffs late fil-
ing was a result of confusion created by the 
courts as to when the statute of limitations began 
to run. Id. 
The facts of this case are just as compelling to apply 
equitable tolling as those in Kucharski. In considering 
equitable tolling, the court examines "(1) the petitioner's 
lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the petition-
er's lack of constructive knowledge of the filing require-
ment; (3) diligence in pursuing one's rights; (4) absence 
of prejudice to the respondent; and (5) the petitioner's 
reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the legal re-
quirement for filing [*24] his claim." Ajazi v. Gonzales, 
216 Fed Appx. 515, 518 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff here 
diligently pursued his rights as evidenced by his first 
filing. Given the Court's Memorandum Order dismissing 
his claims and instructing him to refile upon resolution of 
the criminal proceedings, there was no reason for him to 
know of any other filing requirement, and there is no true 
prejudice to Defendants as previously noted herein. Ac-
cordingly, for these and all of the other reasons previ-
ously discussed herein, the Court finds that Plaintiffs 
second filing is deemed timely and assertion of his fed-
eral claims is not otherwise time-barred. 
C State-Law Claims 
Plaintiffs first suit also asserted a number of 
state-law claims. After the federal claims were dismissed 
without prejudice, continuing supplemental jurisdiction 
over the state-law claims was declined and those claims 
were therefore also dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c)(3), 
Plaintiffs second filing includes reassertion of these 
state-law claims. Of those claims purportedly asserted by 
Kennedy, ,4 Defendants seek dismissal of only the false 
arrest/imprisonment and libel/slander claims as being 
time-barred. According to Defendants, [*25] Kentucky 
has a one-year statute of limitations for both of these 
claims, which one-year period has long since expired. 
Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants' arguments on 
these state-law claims. 
14 According to the Complaint, the state-law 
claims being asserted appear to be for false ar-
rest/imprisonment, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, malicious prosecution, retaliation, 
defamation (libel and slander), and abuse of pro-
cess. 
A one-year period of limitations applies to claims 
for false arrest/imprisonment in Kentucky. K.R.S. § 
413.140(l)(a), (c). The cause of action accrues and the 
one-year period begins to run when the false imprison-
ment ends, which the Kentucky courts define as occur-
ring when the defendant becomes held pursuant to legal 
process, such as being bound over by a magistrate or 
arraigned on charges. See Dunn v. Felty, 226 S. W.3d 68, 
72 (Ky. 2007). 
In this case, Plaintiff was arrested for disorderly 
conduct and taken to the Kenton County Detention Cen-
ter on May 18, 2005. Applying the holding of Dunn, 
Defendants submit the allegedly false imprisonment of 
Plaintiff also ended on May 18, 2005, when he was. re-
leased on bond from the detention center, yet Plaintiff 
[*26] did not refile his lawsuit until over two years later, 
on July 6, 2007. ,5 The Court does not agree with De-
fendants' characterization of when the false imprison-
ment ended. In Dunn, the defendant was released on bail 
the same evening as his arrest, then arraigned the fol-
lowing day. His false imprisonment was deemed to have 
ended "when he became held pursuant to legal process," 
meaning the date he was arraigned on the charges, see 
Dunn, 226 S. W.3d at 72, not the day prior when he was 
released on bail. 
15 As previously noted, this second filing was, 
however, made less than a month after the June 
19, 2007, dismissal date of the criminal charges 
filed against him in conjunction with his May 18, 
2005, arrest. 
It may well be that the applicable period of limita-
tions for Plaintiffs false imprisonment claim expired 
prior to Plaintiffs July 6, 2007, second filing of his law-
suit. But with the record lacking evidence of when Plain-
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tiff became held pursuant to legal process, thereby end-
ing his false imprisonment and also starting the time 
clock from which the statute of limitations ran, the Court 
cannot conclude that Kennedy's false imprisonment 
claim is time-barred. 
Defendants also seek dismissal [*27] of Plaintiffs 
libel and slander claim as untimely. Kentucky law re-
quires such defamation claims be filed within one year of 
when the cause of action accrues. See K.R.S. § 
413.140(l)(d). Generally "it is the publication of the al-
leged libelous matter that causes the defamation or injury 
thus commencing the running of the one year statute of 
limitations provided by KRS 413.140(l)(d)." Caslin v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 608S.W.2d69, 70 (Ky. Ct. App 1980). 
Defendants point to the statements offered in con-
junction with the May 18, 2005, filing of criminal charg-
es as being the purportedly defamatory statements upon 
which Kennedy sues. Plaintiff neither disputes this inter-
pretation of the vague allegations in his Complaint, nor 
offers evidence of any other or additional statements as 
forming the basis of this claim. Starting the one-year 
time clock from this date reveals that Plaintiff had until 
May 18, 2006, within which to timely file a claim for 
libel and slander. 
Plaintiffs first lawsuit was filed in state court on 
May 8, 2006, and included a claim for libel and slander. 
The claim was asserted in a timely fashion in that prior 
action. However, when this Court on October 16, 2006, 
dismissed [*28] Plaintiffs federal claims without preju-
dice as having not yet accrued, see Kennedy v. City of 
Villa Hills, Kentucky, et al, Covington Case No. 06-112 
(Doc. # 8, at p. 5), it also declined to exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state-law claims and 
dismissed them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), (see 
id. at p. 7). Plaintiff could have refiled his libel and slan-
der claim in the Kenton Circuit Court within 90 days of 
that October 16, 2006, Order pursuant to K.R.S. § 
413.270, Kentucky's "saving statute." Apparently, he did 
not do so and instead waited until the conclusion of the 
criminal proceedings and the July 6, 2007, refiling of his 
§ 1983 claims to reassert his state-law claims. However, 
this July 6, 2007, refiling date for his libel and slander 
claim is untimely, and Defendants' request to dismiss this 
claim on this basis will be granted. 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS ORDERED 
that: 
(1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 2) is 
hereby denied in part and granted in part as follows: 
(a) Defendants' request to dismiss 
Plaintiffs § 1983 claims is hereby denied; 
(b) Defendants' request to dismiss 
Plaintiffs state-law claim for false im-
prisonment [*29] is hereby denied; and, 
(c) Defendants' request to dismiss 
Plaintiffs state-law claim for libel and 
slander is hereby granted. 
(2) Defendants shall file their Answer to the re-
mainder of Plaintiffs Complaint within twenty (20) days 
from the date of this Order. 
This 6TH day of March, 2008. 
Signed By: 
David L. Sunning 
United States District Judge 
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No. 1:10-CV-156-CEJ 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 
MISSOURI, SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION 
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January 24,2011, Decided 
January 24,2011, Filed 
CASE SUMMARY: 
OVERVIEW: Plaintiff inmate's motion for leave to 
commence an action without payment of the required 
filing fee was granted. But his claims under 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1985(3) were dismissed as legally frivolous pursuant to 
28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because nothing in the com-
plaint or supplement indicated that inmate was a member 
of a protected class or that defendants were motivated by 
purposeful discrimination. 
OUTCOME: Inmate's motion for leave to commence an 
action without payment of the required filing fee was 
granted, but his claims under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3) were 
dismissed as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 
1915(e)(2)(B). 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > 
Complaints > Filing Fees 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > 
Proceedings in Forma Pauperis > Prisoners > General 
Overview 
[HN1] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner 
bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to 
pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has 
insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the 
entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, 
collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the 
greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prison-
er's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the 
prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After 
payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is 
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the 
preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's ac-
count. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the 
prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the 
Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's 
account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > 
Proceedings in Forma Pauperis > General Overview 
Civil Rights Law > Prisoner Rights > Prison Litigation 
Reform Act > Claim Dismissals 
[HN2] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court 
may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the 
action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief 
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An 
action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either 
law or in fact. An action is malicious when it is under-
taken for the purpose of harassing litigants and not for 
the purpose of vindicating a cognizable right. 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses, 
Demurrers & Objections > Failures to State Claims 
Civil Procedure > Pleading <& Practice > Pleadings > 
Complaints > Requirements 
[HN3] An action fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted if it does not plead enough facts to state a 
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claim to relief that is plausible on its face. To determine 
whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, the court must engage in a two-step in-
quiry. First, the court must identify the allegations in the 
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 
These include legal conclusions and threadbare recitals 
of the elements of a cause of action that are supported by 
mere conclusory statements. Second, the court must de-
termine whether the complaint states a plausible claim 
for relief. This is a context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense. The plaintiff is required to plead facts 
that show more than the mere possibility of misconduct. 
The court must review the factual allegations in the 
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an enti-
tlement to relief. When faced with alternative explana-
tions for the alleged misconduct, the court may exercise 
its judgment in determining whether plaintiffs proffered 
conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more 
likely that no misconduct occurred. 
Civil Procedure > Joinder of Claims & Remedies > 
Claims 
[HN4] Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) states: A party asserting a 
claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as in-
dependent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, 
equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an op-
posing party. As such, multiple claims against a single 
party are valid. 
Civil Procedure > Parties > Joinder > Permissive Join-
der 
[HNS] Fed R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) provides: Persons may be 
joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to 
relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the 
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or oc-
currences; and (B) any question of law or fact common 
to all defendants will arise in the action. 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > 
Proceedings in Forma Pauperis > Prisoners > Three 
Strikes Provision 
Civil Procedure > Parties > Joinder > General Over-
view 
[HN6] In litigation involving prisoners, unrelated claims 
against different defendants belong in different suits in 
part to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees 
because the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the 
number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner 
may file without prepayment of the required fees. 
Civil Procedure > Parties > Joinder > Misjoinder 
[HN7] Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 provides: Misjoinder of parties 
is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion, or 
on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add 
or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim 
against a party. 
Civil Rights Law > Conspiracy > General Overview 
Civil Rights Law > Conspiracy > Elements 
[HN8] Title 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985 concerns conspiracies to 
interfere with civil rights. Section 1985(3) provides in 
pertinent part: If two or more persons conspire for the 
purposes of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any 
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the 
laws, the party so injured or deprived may have an action 
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or 
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 
Thus, to state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must 
establish that: (1) he is a member of a class suffering 
from invidious discrimination; and (2) defendants' ac-
tions were motivated by racial animus or some other type 
of class-based discrimination. 
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > General 
Overview 
Governments > Legislation > Statutes of Limitations > 
Time Limitations 
[HN9] The State of Missouri's five-year statute of limita-
tions for general personal injury claims is applicable to 
causes of action based on 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. 
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > General 
Overview 
[HN10] A state is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C.S. § 
1983 and a § 1983 suit cannot be brought against state 
agency. 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Pleadings > 
Complaints > Requirements 
[HN11] Legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action that are supported by mere 
conclusory statements are not entitled to the assumption 
of truth. 
Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Juris-
diction > Supplemental Jurisdiction > Pendent Claims 
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[HN12] Where federal claims have been dismissed, dis-
trict courts may decline jurisdiction over pendent state 
claims as a matter of discretion. 
COUNSEL: [*1] Charles H. Bishop, Plaintiff, Pro se, 
Cameron, MO. 
JUDGES: Carol E. Jackson, UNITED STATES DIS-
TRICT JUDGE. 
OPINION BY: Carol E. Jackson 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of 
Charles H. Bishop (Registration No. 505063) for leave to 
commence this action without payment of the required 
filing fee. 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) 
[HN1] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prison-
er bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to 
pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has 
insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the 
entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, 
collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the 
greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prison-
er's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the 
prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After 
payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is 
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the 
preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's ac-
count. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having cus-
tody of the prisoner will forward these monthly pay-
ments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the 
prisoner's account exceeds $10, until [*2] the filing fee 
is fully paid. Id. 
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified 
copy of his prison account statement for the six-month 
period immediately preceding the submission of his 
complaint. A review of plaintiffs account indicates an 
average monthly balance of $.21 and an average monthly 
deposit of $94.33. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay 
the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess 
an initial partial filing fee of $18.87, which is 20 percent 
of plaintiff s average monthly deposit. 
28 U.S.C§ 1915(e) 
[HN2] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the 
Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if 
the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary re-
lief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 
An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in 
either law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 
328, 109 S Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). An ac-
tion is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of 
harassing litigants and not for the purpose of vindicating 
a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 
461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), affd 826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 
1987). [HN3] An action fails to state [*3] a claim upon 
which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough 
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 
127 S. Ct 1955, 167 L. Ed 2d 929 (2007). To determine 
whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step in-
quiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the 
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 
Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51, 173 L. Ed. 
2d 868 (2009). These include "legal conclusions" and 
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action 
[that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. 
at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 
1950-51. This is a "context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense." Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to 
plead facts that show more than the "mere possibility of 
misconduct." Id. The Court must review the factual alle-
gations in the complaint "to determine if they plausibly 
suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1951. When faced 
with alternative explanations for the alleged [*4] mis-
conduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in deter-
mining whether plaintiffs proffered conclusion is the 
most plausible or whether it is more likely that no mis-
conduct occurred. Id. at 1950- 52. 
The Complaint and Supplement 
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Western Missouri Correc-
tional Center, seeks monetary, declaratory, and unspeci-
fied injunctive relief in this action brought pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for alleged constitutional viola-
tions that occurred while he was incarcerated at the 
Southeast Correctional Center ("SECC"). In addition, 
plaintiff asserts state-law claims for assault and battery 
and negligence. Plaintiff names the following individuals 
and entities as defendants: Correctional Medical Services 
("CMS"), Missouri Department of Corrections, State of 
Missouri, Larry Crawford (Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Corrections), George Lombardi (Director, Mis-
souri Department of Corrections), Chuck Dwyer (Super-
intendent, SECC), Laura Vance (Associate Superinten-
dent, SECC), Michael Cornell (Assistant Superintendent, 
SECC), Omer Clark (Associate Superintendent, SECC), 
Bill Harris (Director of Recreation, SECC), Johnny Wil-
liams (Functional Unit Manager, SECC), Erik Harper 
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[*5] (Sergeant, SECC), Alex Clinton (Sergeant, SECC), 
Travis Wilhite (Sergeant, SECC), Travis Jackson (Cor-
rectional Officer, SECC), Charlana Dunn (Correctional 
Officer, SECC), Joshua Lacy (Correctional Officer, 
SECC), Aaron Gilliland (Correctional Officer, SECC), 
Richard Leavitt (Captain, SECC), Dan Martinez (Lieu-
tenant, SECC), Tracey Mitchem (Classification Case-
worker Assistant, SECC), Melisa Dorris (Classification 
Caseworker, SECC), Arthur S. Keiper, III (Doctor, 
CMS), Elizabeth Conley (Regional Medical Director and 
Doctor, CMS), Michael Hakala (Doctor, CMS), Glen 
Babich (Medical Directo Doctor, SECC), Marsha Aters 
(Registered Nurse, CMS), and John Does #1 - #7. 
The complaint consists of numerous claims arising 
out of three separate incidents that allegedly occurred 
while plaintiff was incarcerated at SECC in 2005. Plain-
tiff refers to the first event as the "August Attack" and 
the second and third events as the "October Attacks." 
1. The "August Attack" 
Plaintiff has filed as a supplement to the complaint 
an affidavit entitled "Affidavit by Charles H. Bishop, 
#505063 Regarding Assault by Inmate 8-15-2005" [Doc. 
#4]. The affidavit is twenty-three pages long and consists 
of 108 numbered paragraphs. [*6] In the affidavit, 
plaintiff states that he adheres to the "doctrine of separa-
tism," and as such, during his SECC incarceration, he 
"would not cell or live with [a black inmate] under any 
circumstances." He alleges that he relayed this infor-
mation to defendant Charlana Dunn and told her that, if 
he was forced to cell with a black inmate, the situation 
would constitute an imminent threat to his safety and 
security, and he, plaintiff, would be assaulted. Plaintiff 
further states that when he realized he was going to be 
celled with a black inmate, he told defendant Dunn, 
"[P]ut me in a cell with another white boy." Plaintiff 
states that, despite his many warnings to defendants 
Dunn, Clinton, John Does #1 and #2, Mitchem, Wil-
liams, Harper, and "several other unknown C.O.'s," l he 
was assigned to a cell with a black inmate. Plaintiff al-
leges that, on August 15, 2005, in the presence of de-
fendant Travis Jackson, his cellmate attacked him, stab-
bing him twenty-four times and breaking plaintiffs left 
hand. 
1 The Court will refer to the "unknown C.O.'s" 
as John Does #3 and #4. 
Plaintiff states that he was immediately transported 
by ambulance to the SECC infirmary, and during this 
time, defendants [*7] Jackson and Martinez refused to 
remove plaintiffs handcuffs, even after he told them his 
left hand might be broken. Plaintiff claims that defendant 
Dr. Arthur Keiper examined him at the infirmary and 
refused to send him to "an outside emergency medical 
trauma center," despite defendant Richard Leavitt's de-
sire to do so, and as a result, plaintiff suffered permanent 
injuries. Plaintiff claims that although John Doe #5 
overrode Leavitt's authority to send plaintiff to an outside 
trauma center, by not insisting that plaintiff nevertheless 
be transferred, Leavitt violated his duty to protect him. 
Plaintiff states that, on the orders of John Doe #5, he was 
sent to "the [SECC] observation cell for approximately 
eight hours with no pain medication, waiting to get put 
back together." 
Plaintiff claims that it was not until the morning fol-
lowing the attack that defendant Dr. Glen Babich began 
to suture his wounds. Babich also wrote a referral for 
plaintiff to have a chest x-ray, blood tests, and an ap-
pointment with an eye doctor. Plaintiff claims that Ba-
bich totally ignored his broken left hand. Plaintiff states 
that it took "several days and weeks to get these referrals 
done," and he was not [*8] seen by defendant Dr. Ha-
kala until September 1, 2005. Dr. Hakala took an x-ray 
of plaintiffs hand, but the x-ray was misplaced and an-
other x-ray was taken on September 15, 2005. Plaintiff 
was transported to Festus for an MRI on September 28, 
2005, and after reviewing the results later that same day, 
Dr. Hakala referred him to a hand specialist, Dr. Camer-
on, who is not a defendant in this action. Plaintiff asserts 
that his hand "was never fixed . . . until [he] saw Dr. 
Cameron," and that Dr. Hakala's unreasonable delay in 
getting plaintiffs x-rays, MRI, and referral to a hand and 
joint specialist constitutes malpractice and deliberate 
indifference. 
As to defendant Elizabeth Conley, plaintiff states 
that she is a CMS employee "and has the final say in the 
kind of treatment prisoners get." Plaintiff alleges that 
Conley was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs 
in connection with the August 15, 2005 inmate attack, in 
that she "completely disregarded] any other doctors [sic] 
request for necessary medical treatment." In addition, 
plaintiff states that CMS "refused to provide any neces-
sary, adequate, meaningful, and timely medical care"; 
however, he also states, "I have been seen [*9] by many 
nurses and doctors since the stabbing assault of 
8/15/2005 . . . resulting] in no or temporary relief." 
Plaintiff complains that the State of Missouri failed 
to prosecute the inmate who assaulted him on August 15, 
and the Missouri Department of Corrections refused to 
accept any responsibility for putting plaintiff in a posi-
tion of danger. 
2. The "October Attacks" 
In addition to the "August Attack" affidavit, plaintiff 
has attached to the complaint an affidavit entitled "Affi-
davit Regarding October Attacks by Staff [Doc. #1, pp. 
28-42]. The affidavit is fifteen pages long and consists of 
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thirty-five numbered paragraphs. Plaintiffs claims rela-
tive to the "October Attacks" arise out of two separate 
events, one on October 11, 2005, and the other on Octo-
ber 23, 2005. Plaintiff states that on October 11, defend-
ant Alex Clinton, an SECC correctional officer, "vio-
lently and physically assault[ed]" plaintiff, repeatedly 
slamming his body and face into a cell door which re-
sulted in a broken nose. Plaintiff claims that defendants 
Gilliland and Lacy failed to protect him from this unnec-
essary and excessive use of force and failed to notify 
defendant Larry Crawford of the attack, as required 
[*10] by Missouri law. Plaintiff also claims that defend-
ant Aters refused to provide him necessary medical care 
for his injuries. 
Plaintiff further states that on October 23, 2005, de-
fendant Charlana Dunn violated his constitutional rights 
by insisting that plaintiff place his injured left hand in a 
food port so she could handcuff him. Following this in-
cident, plaintiff claims that defendant Dunn continued to 
use excessive force and abused him in "the same unnec-
essary, aggressive, and hostile manner" in retaliation for 
filing prison grievances against her. Plaintiff claims that 
he reported these incidents to defendants Williams, Har-
per, and Clinton, but nothing was done. He also claims 
that, in retaliation for filing grievances against her, de-
fendant Dunn offered "special treatment and favors" to 
other John Doe defendants 2 if they would assault plain-
tiff. 
2 The Court will refer to these "other John Doe 
defendants" as John Does #6 and #7. 
Discussion 
1. Joinder 
[HN4] Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure states, "A party asserting a claim to relief as an 
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate 
claims, as many claims, [*11] legal, equitable, or mari-
time, as the party has against an opposing party." As 
such, multiple claims against a single party are valid. 
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 
The instant action, however, presents a case involv-
ing multiple claims against multiple defendants.3 [HN5] 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) is controlling 
and provides: "Persons . . . may be joined in one action 
as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against 
them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect 
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any ques-
tion of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in 
the action." Thus, "Claim A against Defendant 1 should 
not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 
2." George v. Smith, 507 F3d at 607. Moreover, the 
Court notes that [HN6] in litigation involving prisoners, 
"Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in 
different suits, . . . [in part] to ensure that prisoners pay 
the required filing fees - for the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals 
that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the 
required [* 12] fees." Id. 
3 The defendants named in connection with the 
August 15, 2005 incident are Johnny Williams, 
Erik Harper, Alex Clinton, Travis Jackson, Char-
lana Dunn, John Does #1 through #5, Richard 
Leavitt, Dan Martinez, Tracey Mitchem, Arthur 
S. Keiper, Elizabeth Conley, Michael Hakala, 
Glen Babich, CMS, Missouri Department of 
Corrections, and State of Missouri. Regarding the 
October 11, 2005 incident, the named defendants 
are Larry Crawford, Alex Clinton, Aaron Gilli-
land, Joshua Lacy, and Marsha Aters. Defendants 
Charlana Dunn, John Does #6 and #7, Johnny 
Williams, Erik Harper, and Alex Clinton are 
named in relation to the October 23, 2005 inci-
dent and Dunn's alleged efforts to enlist others to 
assault plaintiff. Plaintiff does not assert any 
claims or allegations against defendants George 
Lombardi, Chuck Dwyer, Laura Vance, Michael 
Cornell, Omer Clark, Bill Harris, Travis Wilhite, 
or Melisa Dorris. 
At issue in the instant case is whether the thirty-four 
named defendants are properly joined in this single ac-
tion. See id. (district court should question joinder of 
defendants and claims in prisoner cases). The Court 
holds that they are not. 
Simply stated, plaintiffs allegations relative to 
[*13] the August 15 incident do not pertain to the same 
defendants or arise out of the same series of transactions 
and occurrences as those involved in either the October 
11 or the October 23 incident, nor do they involve simi-
lar questions of law or fact. Plaintiffs "August Attack" 
claims arise out of the physical injuries he sustained and 
the medical treatment he received, or failed to receive, 
after his cellmate assaulted him on August 15, 2005. The 
"October Attacks" claims, on the other hand, arise out of 
two completely different sets of events. The first in-
volves an alleged assault by a prison guard on October 
11, resulting in plaintiff breaking his nose. The second 
event arises out of a totally different incident on October 
23 involving a different prison guard's attempt to inten-
tionally inflict pain on plaintiff by handcuffing his wrists 
in a food port and enlisting others at SECC to harm 
plaintiff in retaliation for filing prison grievances. Thus, 
not only do plaintiffs August 15, October 11, and Octo-
ber 23 claims pertain to and arise out of wholly unrelated 
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events, but his alleged injuries resulting from the various 
occurrences are distinctly different. These three occur-
rences [*14] and the claims arising out of each of them 
do not share common questions of law or fact. Each of 
plaintiffs claims will require its own review of entirely 
separate events asserted against different groups of de-
fendants. For these reasons, the Court concludes that the 
thirty-four named defendants are not properly joined 
under Rule 20(a)(2). 
[HN7] Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides: 
Misjoinder of parties is not a ground 
for dismissing an action. On motion, or on 
its own, the court may at any time, on just 
terms, add or drop a party. The court may 
also sever any claim against a party. 
Because the claims and defendants cannot be properly 
joined in one complaint under Rule 20(a)(2), the Court 
will deem the plaintiff as having submitted three separate 
lawsuits, each utilizing the same complaint, as follows: 
(1) The instant complaint will be con-
strued as asserting claims arising solely 
from the August 15 incident. These claims 
will be reviewed for frivolity under 28 
U.S.C § 1915 (e) in this Memorandum. 
(2) A copy of the instant complaint 
will be used for the second lawsuit, and 
will be construed as asserting claims 
against against defendants Larry Craw-
ford, Alex Clinton, Aaron [*15] Gilli-
land, Joshua Lacy, and Marsha Aters 
arising solely from the October 11, 2005 
incident. Plaintiff will be required to ei-
ther pay the full filing fee for the second 
lawsuit or submit a motion for leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis. If a motion for 
leave to file without payment of the filing 
fee is submitted, the Court will then re-
view the claims in the second lawsuit for 
frivolity under 28 U.S. C. § 1915 (e). 
(3) A copy of the instant complaint 
will be used for the third lawsuit, and will 
be construed as asserting claims against 
defendants Charlana Dunn, John Does #6 
and #7, Johnny Williams, Erik Harper, 
and Alex Clinton arising solely from the 
October 23, 2005 incident. Plaintiff will 
be required to either pay the full filing fee 
for the third lawsuit or submit a motion 
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. If 
a motion for leave to file without payment 
of the filing fee is submitted, the Court 
will then review the claims in the third 
lawsuit for frivolity under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e). 
Because the same complaint will be used, all three 
lawsuits will be considered as having been submitted on 
the same date. If the Court were to sever and dismiss the 
mis-joined claims and defendants, [*16] the statute of 
limitations might preclude plaintiff from re-asserting the 
claims based on the October 11 or the October 25 inci-
dent in a new complaint. 
2. Review of August 15,2005 claims under 28 U.S.C § 
1915(e) 
Plaintiff alleges that defendants Johnny Williams, 
Erik Harper, Alex Clinton, Travis Jackson, Charlana 
Dunn, John Does #1 through #5, Richard Leavitt, Dan 
Martinez, Tracey Mitchem, Arthur S. Keiper, Elizabeth 
Conley, Michael Hakala, Glen Babich, CMS, Missouri 
Department of Corrections, and State of Missouri vio-
lated his rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1983. 
a. Section 1985 claims 
[HN8] Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985 concerns conspiracies 
to interfere with civil rights. Although plaintiff does not 
specify under which subsection of § 1985 he is proceed-
ing, the Court will liberally construe the allegations un-
der § 1985(3), which provides in pertinent part: 
If two or more persons . . . conspire . . . 
for the purposes of depriving, either di-
rectly or indirectly, any person or class of 
persons of the equal protection of the 
laws, or of equal privileges and immuni-
ties under the laws . . . the party so injured 
or deprived may have an action for the 
recovery of damages occasioned by such 
injury or [*17] deprivation, against any 
one or more of the conspirators. 
Thus, to state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must 
establish that (1) he is a member of a class suffering from 
invidious discrimination; and (2) defendants' actions 
were motivated by racial animus or some other type of 
class-based discrimination. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 
Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-39, 103 S. Ct. 
3352, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1049 (1983); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 
403 U.S. 88, 102-03\ 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338 
(1971) (plaintiff must allege these two elements to state § 
1985(3) claim). In the instant action, nothing in the com-
plaint or supplement indicates that plaintiff is a member Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of a protected class or that defendants were motivated by 
purposeful discrimination. As such, plaintiffs § 1985(3) 
claims will be dismissed as legally frivolous. 
b. Section 1983 claims 
[HN9] The State of Missouri's five-year statute of 
limitations for general personal injury claims is applica-
ble to causes of action based on § 1983. See Owens v. 
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S. Ct. 573, 102 L. Ed. 
2d 594 (1989); Lohman v. Kempker, 34 Fed. Appx. 514, 
2002 WL 992330 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying Missouri 
five-year statute of limitations to a cause of action under 
§ 1983). All of plaintiffs allegations relative to the Au-
gust 15, 2005 [*18] inmate assault occurred on or prior 
to September 28, 2005, when Dr. Hakala referred plain-
tiff to the hand specialist, Dr. Cameron. Plaintiffs com-
plaint bears a signature date of October 6, 2010. As such, 
plaintiffs § 1983 claims against defendants Williams, 
Harper, Clinton, Jackson, Dunn, John Does #1 through 
#5, Leavitt, Martinez, Mitchem, Keiper, Conley, Hakala, 
Babich, CMS, Missouri Department of Corrections, and 
State of Missouri arising out of the August 15 occurrence 
are barred by the five-year statute of limitations and will 
be dismissed as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B). See Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 
(8th Cir. 7P92Xdistrict court may properly dismiss in 
forma pauperis complaint when it is apparent the statute 
of limitations has run). 
As additional reasons for dismissing plaintiffs § 
1983 claims, the Court notes that the State of Missouri 
and the Missouri Department of Corrections are hot sua-
ble entities under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of 
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63, 109 S Ct. 2304, 105 L Ed. 
2d 45 (1989) ([HN10] state is not a "person" under § 
1983)\Alsbrookv. City of Maumelle, 184F.3d999, 1010 
(8th Cir. 1999) {§ 1983 suit cannot be brought against 
state agency), cert. [*19] dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001, 120 
S. Ct. 1265, 146 L. Ed. 2d 215 (2000). To state a claim 
against CMS, a plaintiff must allege that there was a 
policy, custom, or official action that caused an actiona-
ble injury. See Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 
F.2d 972, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1993). The instant complaint 
and supplement do not contain any such allegations. 
Moreover, plaintiffs conclusory allegations that Eliza-
beth Conley "completely disregard[ed] any other doctors 
[sic] request for necessary medical treatment" and that 
CMS "refused to provide any necessary, adequate, 
meaningful, and timely medical care" do not rise to the 
level of a constitutional violation and are legally frivo-
lous, particularly in light of plaintiffs contrary allega-
tions that he was, in fact, treated by CMS physicians 
Arthur Keiper and Michael Hakala. See Ashcroft v. Iq-
bal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 
(2009)([HN\\] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals 
of the elements of a cause of action that are supported by 
mere conclusory statements are not entitled to the as-
sumption of truth). 
For the above-stated reasons and, having carefully 
reviewed plaintiffs allegations relative to the August 15, 
2005 occurrence, the Court concludes that this action 
should be dismissed [*20] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B). 
Because plaintiffs federal claims will be dismissed, 
all remaining pendent state claims will be dismissed, as 
well. See 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers 
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 
218 (1966) (if federal claims are dismissed before trial, 
remaining state claims should also be dismissed); Hassett 
v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 851 F.2d 1127, 1130 (8th 
Cir. 1988) ([HN12] where federal claims have been dis-
missed, district courts may decline jurisdiction over 
pendent state claims as a "matter of discretion"). 
Last, the Court will dismiss without prejudice de-
fendants George Lombardi, Chuck Dwyer, Laura Vance, 
Michael Cornell, Omer Clark, Bill Harris, Travis 
Wilhite, and Melisa Dorris, because plaintiff has failed to 
assert any allegations against them. See Martin v. Sar-
gent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not 
cognizable under § 1983 where plaintiff fails to allege 
defendant was personally involved in or directly respon-
sible for incidents that injured plaintiff); Boyd v. Knox, 
47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. /995;(respondeat superior 
theory inapplicable in § 1983 suits). 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion 
to proceed in forma pauperis [*21] [Doc. #2] is 
GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall 
pay an initial filing fee of $18.87 within thirty (30) days 
of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make 
his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District 
Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his 
prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) 
that the remittance is for an original proceeding. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants 
George Lombardi, Chuck Dwyer, Laura Vance, Michael 
Cornell, Omer Clark, Bill Harris, Travis Wilhite, and 
Melisa Dorris are DISMISSED without prejudice, be-
cause plaintiff has failed to assert any claims or allega-
tions against them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs 
claims against defendants Larry Crawford, Alex Clinton, 
Aaron Gilliland, Joshua Lacy, and Marsha Aters, arising 
from the October 11,2005 incident, are SEVERED from 
the instant action, because they are not properly joined 
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under Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The Clerk of Court is instructed shall open a new 
case, utilizing the complaint [Doc. #1] submitted here. 
The new case will be styled Charles H. Bishop v. Larry 
Crawford, Alex Clinton, [*22] Aaron Gilliland, Joshua 
Lacy, and Marsha Aters, and will bear a Southeastern 
Division number. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs 
claims against defendants Charlana Dunn, John Does #6 
and #7, Johnny Williams, Erik Harper, and Alex Clinton, 
arising from the October 23, 2005 incident, are SEV-
ERED from the instant action, because they are not 
properly joined in this action under Rule 20(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of Court is 
instructed shall open a new case, utilizing the complaint 
[Doc. #1] submitted here. The new case will be styled 
Charles H. Bishop v. Charlana Dunn, John Doe #6, John 
Doe #7, Johnny Williams, Erik Harper, and Alex Clinton 
and will bear a Southeastern Division number. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as to plaintiffs 
remaining claims against defendants Johnny Williams, 
Erik Harper, Alex Clinton, Travis Jackson, Charlana 
Dunn, John Does #1 through #5, Richard Leavitt, Dan 
Martinez, Tracey Mitchem, Arthur S. Keiper, Elizabeth 
Conley, Michael Hakala, Glen Babich, CMS, Missouri 
Department of Corrections, and the State of Missouri, 
arising from the August 15, 2005 incident, the Clerk 
shall not issue process or cause process to issue, because 
the [*23] allegations are legally frivolous and fail to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 
U.S.C§ 1915(e)(2)(B). 
Dated this 24th day of January, 2011 
/s/ Carol E. Jackson 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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OPINION 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
This matter is before the court on Defendants Patri-
cia Osier, Jeffrey Morgan, Lawrence Reynard, Morgan 
Larson, James Skinner, Donald Carey, City of Omaha, 
Randy Anderson, Kevin Housh, Donald Truckenbrod, 
Michael Scott, and Jason Christensen's (collectively 
"City Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment. l 
(Filing No. 235.) As set forth below, the City Defend-
ants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part. 
1 Also pending before the court is Defendant 
Lori Anzaldo's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(filing no. 267) and Plaintiffs Objection to 
Anzaldo's Motion to Extend Deadlines (filing no. 
266). For clarity, the court will address these Mo-
tions in a separate Memorandum and Order. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Steven R. Blair ("Blair") filed his original 
Complaint in this matter on August 3, 2007. (Filing No. 
1.) After several lengthy extensions of time, Blair filed 
an Amended Complaint and the court permitted this 
matter to proceed to service. (Filing Nos. 15, 16 and 17.) 
In his Amended Complaint, Blair named 27 Defendants: 
the City of Omaha, Nebraska; Douglas County, Nebras-
ka; [*4] and 25 individuals. (Filing No. 16.) 
Since service of process, the court has resolved nu-
merous motions and dismissed Blair's claims against 14 
of the 27 Defendants. (Filing Nos. 110, 167, 169, and 
249.) On October 26, 2009, the court issued a Memo-
randum and Order that addressed 24 pending Motions. 
(Filing No. 249.) In that Order, the court limited discov-
ery in this matter to the issue of qualified immunity only 
and resolved all of the pending Motions except for the 
City Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Filing 
No. 235.) The court also granted Blair until December 
15, 2009, to respond to the City Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (Id) 
On December 15, 2009, Blair filed a Brief in Oppo-
sition to the City Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment along with an Index of Evidence in Support. 
(Filing Nos. 258 and 260.) The City Defendants replied 
with an additional Brief in Support of their Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (Filing No. 269.) 
The party seeking the entry of summary judgment in 
its favor must set forth "a separate statement of material 
facts as to which the moving party contends there is no 
genuine issue to be tried and that entitle the moving party 
to judgment as a matter [*5] of law." NECivR 
56.1(a)(1). If the non-moving party opposes the motion, 
that party must "include in its [opposing] brief a concise 
response to the moving party's statement of material 
facts." NECivR 56.1(b)(1). Such response must "address 
each numbered paragraph in the movant's statement" of 
facts and must contain pinpoint citations to evidence 
supporting the opposition. Id. "Properly referenced mate-
rial facts in the movant's statement will be deemed ad-
mitted unless controverted by the opposing party's re-
sponse." Id; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("A support-
ing or opposing affidavit must be made on personal 
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in ev-
idence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify 
on the matters stated."). 
The City Defendants have submitted a statement of 
material facts in accordance with the court's Local Rules. 
Blair has submitted a Brief and an Index of Evidence in 
response. This matter is therefore deemed fully submit-
ted and the court adopts the following relevant undis-
puted facts. 
//. RELEVANT UNDISPUTED FACTS 
A. Parties 
1. Blair is a resident of Omaha, Nebraska. (See 
Docket Sheet.) 
2. Defendants Randy Anderson (also known as 
Randy Szemplenski) [*6] ("Szemplenski"), Kevin 
Housh ("Housh"), Donald Truckenbrod ("Truckenbrod"), 
Michael Scott ("Scott"), Jason Christensen ("Christen-
sen"), Lawrence Reynard ("Reynard") and Morgan Lar-
son ("Larson") are all police officers employed by the 
City of Omaha. (Filing No. 16; Filing No. 236-2, Attach. 
1 at CM/ECF p. 1; Filing No. 236-3, Attach. 2 at 
CM/ECF p. 1; 236-4, Attach. 3 at CM/ECF p. 1; Filing 
No. 236-5, Attach. 4 at CM/ECF p. 1; Filing No. 236-6, 
Attach. 5 at CM/ECF p. 1.) 
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3. Jeffrey Morgan ("Morgan") was employed as a 
police officer with the City of Omaha from 1985 through 
2008. (Filing No. 236-7, Attach. 6 at CM/ECF p. 1.) 
4. Patricia Osier ("Osier") was employed as a Senior 
Crime Lab Technician with the City of Omaha in 1997. 
Osier retired in September 2007. (Filing No 236-8,, At-
tach. 7 at CM/ECF p. 1.) 
5. James N. Skinner ("Skinner") was employed as 
Chief of the Omaha Police Department ("OPD") from 
November 9, 1989, through August 20, 1997. (Filing No. 
238-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF p. 1.) 
6. Donald L. Carey ("Carey") was employed as 
Chief of the OPD from August 1998 through June 2003. 
(FilingNo. 236-13, Attach. 12 atCM/ECFp. 1.) 
B. Blair's Arrest 
7. On May 12, 1997, police officers Housh, [*7] 
Truckenbrod, Scott and Christensen went to 2035 Maple 
Street, in Omaha, Nebraska. 
8. Upon arriving at 2035 Maple Street, the officers 
found the front door open. Blair appeared in the doorway 
and identified himself. The officers asked him to step 
down from the doorway, patted him down and hand-
cuffed him. 
9. The officers then became aware of the presence of 
other people in the house. Scott, Christensen, and 
Truckenbrod entered the house tlirough the open front 
door. 
10. Upon entering the house the officers observed 
three men in the living room of the house. The officers 
also saw a shotgun in plain view leaning against the wall 
near the front door. The officers unloaded the shotgun 
and secured it in the trunk of a police cruiser. 
11. The three men in the living room were staring 
nervously at a large duffel bag in the middle of the room. 
Because of this behavior, the officers moved the bag 
beyond the men's reach. Christensen then opened the bag 
and found a loaded rifle. He removed the rifle and se-
cured it in a police cruiser. 
12. After securing the rifle, Scott remained with the 
three men in the living room, while Truckenbrod and 
Christensen completed a brief walk-through of the rest of 
the .[* 8] house. 
13. Eventually, Plaintiff was arrested for the assault 
and kidnaping of his ex-girlfriend Patty Dory ("Dory") 
and taken from the scene to the OPD Central Station. 
There, Housh turned Blair over to other police personnel. 
(Filing No. 236-2, Attach. 1; Filing No. 236-4, At-
tach. 3; Filing No. 236-6, Attach. 5; Filing No. 236-5, 
Attach. 4.) 
C. Blair's Trial 
14. During Blair's trial, several witnesses testified 
including officers Housh, Szemplenski and Christensen. 
15. Housh testified that the alleged assault and kid-
naping was first reported between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m. 
(Filing No. 260 at CM/ECF p. 36; Filing No. 236-2, At-
tach. 1 at CM/ECF p. 4.) 
16. Szemplenski also testified that uniformed offic-
ers first responded to the original call at 5:45 p.m. (Filing 
No. 260 at CM/ECF p. 26; Filing No. 236-3, Attach. 2 at 
CM/ECF pp. 4-5.) 
17. Christensen originally testified that he arrived at 
Blair's residence "around 5:00 p.m." However, he later 
stated that the time in his report, 8:00 p.m., would be the 
correct time. (Filing No. 260 at CM/ECF p. 39.) Chris-
tensen's Uniform Patrol Bureau Daily Sheet indicates 
that the original report occurred at "1730" (5:30 p.m.) 
and that he was dispatched to Blair's [*9] residence at 
2000 hours (8:00 p.m.). (Filing No. 236-5, Attach. 4 at 
CM/ECF p. 8.) 
18. Housh's Uniform Crime Report states that the 
incident was reported at "1730-1745," (5:30-5:45 p.m.). 
In addition, it provides that Blair was booked at "1800" 
(6:00 p.m.). (Filing No. 236-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 
6-7.) 
19. OPD's Supplementary Report of the incident, 
prepared by Lisa Rankin, also states that the original 
report occurred at "1745" (5:45 p.m.). (Filing No. 236-3, 
Attach. 2 at CM/ECF pp. 6-20.) 
20. OPD officers are trained regarding the "investi-
gation of crimes, preparation of reports, . . . handling of 
witnesses and evidence, . . . legal limits on police activi-
ties, . . . testimony in court and . . . necessity to be truth-
ful and accurate." (Filing No. 238-2, Attach. 1 at 
CM/ECF p. 2.) 
21. However, phone records show that Dory first 
called 911 to report the incident at 1832 (6:32 p.m.). 
(FilingNo. 236-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF p. 4.) 
22. Despite this time discrepancy, Blair was con-
victed of kidnaping, use of a deadly weapon to commit a 
felony and terroristic threats and subsequently sentenced 
on June 16, 1998. See State v. Blair, 14 Neb. Ct. App. 
190, 707 N. W.2d 8, 11 (Neb. Ct App. 2005). 
D. Blair's First Federal [* 10] Lawsuit 
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23. On April 3, 2001, Blair filed his first lawsuit in 
this court relating to his May 12, 1997, arrest. Blair filed 
this suit against Szemplenski, Truckenbrod, Housh and 
Christensen alleging that they violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights by arresting him and searching his 
residence without probable cause. (Case No. 
4:01CV3065, Filing Nos. 1 and 6; Case No. 
4:04CV3229, Filing No. 31 at CM/ECF pp. 6-10.) Spe-
cifically, Blair alleged that he was arrested before Dory 
ever called 911 to report her allegations. (Case No. 
4:01CV3065, Filing No. 6; Case No. 4:04CV3229, Filing 
No. 31 at CM/ECF pp. 6-10.) 
24. On June 26, 2001, United States Magistrate 
Judge Kathleen A. Jadzemis conducted an initial review 
of Blair's April 3, 2001, complaint and concluded that his 
claims were barred by the "holding of Heck v. Humph-
rey:' 2 (Case No. 4:01CV3065, Filing No. 7; Case No. 
4:04CV3229, Filing No. 31 at CM/ECF p. 22.) However, 
because Judge Jadzemis was uncertain about whether 
Blair's state conviction had been invalidated, she gave 
him leave to file an amended complaint. (Id.) 
2 As set forth by the Supreme Court in Preiser 
v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S Ct. 1827, 36 L. 
Ed 2d 439 (1973), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 
U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 
(1994), [* 11] if success on the merits of a civil 
rights claim would necessarily implicate the va-
lidity of a conviction or continued confinement of 
a convicted state prisoner, the civil rights claim 
must be preceded by a favorable outcome in ha-
beas corpus or similar proceedings in a state or 
federal forum. Absent such a favorable disposi-
tion of the charges or conviction, a plaintiff may 
not use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to cast doubt on the le-
gality of his conviction or confinement. See Heck, 
512 US. at 486-87. 
25. Blair could not establish that his conviction had 
been invalidated and the court dismissed his case on 
November 16, 2001. (Case No. 4:01CV3065, Filing Nos. 
10 and 11.) 
26. On December 11, 2001, Blair appealed to the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Case No. 4:01CV3065, 
Filing No. 12.) The Eighth Circuit affirmed the court's 
decision on July 7, 2002. (Case No. 4:01CV3065, Filing 
No. 24.) 
E. Blair's State Court Post-Conviction Proceedings 
27. On August 11,2003, the Nebraska District Court 
set aside Blair's conviction on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel and ordered a new trial. State 
v. Blair, 14 Neb. Ct. App. 190, 707 N.W.2d 8, 13 (Neb. 
Ct. App. 2005). 
28. The court specifically concluded that Blair's 
[*12] defense counsel was ineffective in failing to pro-
duce witnesses at Blair's trial. Id. 
F. Blair's Second Federal Lawsuit 
29. On August 25, 2004, Blair filed his second com-
plaint in this court relating to his May 12, 1997, arrest. 
(Case No. 4:04CV3229, Filing No. 1.) Blair filed this 
Complaint against the same police officers as his first 
federal case, Case No. 4:01CV3065, but also added addi-
tional defendants. (Id.) 
30. On July 26, 2006, United States District Judge 
Richard Kopf stayed Blair's second case because he had 
not yet been retried, and therefore, had not obtained a 
final favorable outcome in his criminal case as contem-
plated by Heck. (Case No. 4:04CV3229, Filing No. 57 at 
CM/ECF p. 7.) After entering the stay, the parties and the 
court agreed to close the case provided that Blair could 
reopen it upon the completion of his criminal proceed-
ings in state court. (Case No. 4.04CV3229, Filing No. 59 
at CM/ECF p. 2.) 
G. Dismissal of the Charges Against Blair and His 
Current Federal Lawsuit 
31. Ultimately, the Douglas County Attorney decid-
ed to dismiss the charges against Blair instead of pro-
ceeding with a new trial. The County made this decision 
for several reasons, including the fact [*13] that Blair 
had already served approximately eight years in jail and 
it was unlikely that a conviction would result in a sub-
stantial amount of additional incarceration. (Filing No. 
236-14, Attach. 13 at CM/ECF pp. 3-4.) 
32. On August 3, 2007, Blair filed his third, and 
current, lawsuit in this court relating to his May 12, 
1997, arrest. (Filing No. 1.) Although Blair did not move 
to reopen his second case, Case No. 4:04CV3229, the 
court permitted his claims to proceed as a new case in 
accordance with the court's prior stay order. (Filing No. 
15.) 
/// . CITY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUM-
MARYJUDGMENT 
Blair's Complaint alleges seven separate causes of 
action against the City Defendants. (Filing No. 16.) The 
City Defendants argue they are entitled to summary 
judgment on each of these claims. (Filing No. 237.) For 
the reasons discussed below, the court agrees in part. 
A. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment should be granted only "if the 
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, 
and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as 
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to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). 
See also Egan v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 23 F.3d 
I444t J446 (8th Cir. 1994). [*14] It is not the court's 
function to weigh evidence in the summary judgment 
record to determine the truth of any factual issue. Bell v. 
Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999). In 
passing upon a motion for summary judgment, the dis-
trict court must view the facts in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion. Dancy v. Hyster Co., 
121F.3d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 1997). 
In order to withstand a motion for summary judg-
ment, the nonmoving party must substantiate the allega-
tions with '"sufficient probative evidence [that] would 
permit a finding in [their] favor on more than mere spec-
ulation, conjecture, or fantasy.'" Moody v. St. Charles 
County, 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 
1992)). "A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to 
avoid summary judgment." Id. Essentially the test is 
"whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement 
to require submission to a jury or whether it is so 
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 
106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L Ed. 2d 202 (1986). 
B. Fourth Amendment Claims 
The City Defendants argue that Blair's unlawful 
search and seizure and [*15] unlawful arrest claims 
(collectively the "Fourth Amendment Claims) are barred 
by the statute of limitations. Alternatively, the City De-
fendants argue that the officers' actions were reasonable 
and appropriate under the Fourth Amendment and they 
are entitled to qualified immunity. As set forth below, the 
court concludes that Blair's Fourth Amendment claims 
are not barred by the statue of limitations. Further, there 
are material questions of fact about whether the officers 
had probable cause to arrest Blair or search his residence. 
1. Statute of Limitations 
Plaintiffs claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. (Filing No. 81.) "The applicable state law statute 
of limitations governs § 1983 claims." Baker v. Chisom, 
501 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal). 
In Nebraska, there is a four-year statute of limitations 
that applies to suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207\ See Poor Bear v. Nesbitt, 
300 F. Supp. 2d 904, 912-13 (D. Neb. 2004) (affirming 
dismissal of § 1983 claim that alleged, among other 
things, an improper arrest because the four-year statute 
of limitations found in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 had run) 
(quoting Bauers v. City of Lincoln, 245 Neb. 632, 514 
N.W.2d 625, 634 (Neb. 1994) [*16] which relied upon 
Bridgeman v. Nebraska State Pen, 849 F2d 1076, 1077 
(8th Cir. 1988)). 
As discussed above, Blair's arrest and search of his 
residence occurred on May 12, 1997. Thus, Blair was 
required to file his Fourth Amendment claims by May 
12,2001. Because Blair filed this case on August 3,2007 
(filing no. L), his Fourth Amendment claims are barred 
unless the statute of limitations is somehow tolled by the 
particularized circumstances of this case. Blair argues 
that statute of limitations should be tolled in this case 
because he originally filed his Fourth Amendment claims 
on April 3, 2001 (see case no. 4:01CV3065, filing nos. 1 
and 6; case no. 4:04CV3229, filing no. 31 at CM/ECF p. 
6-10), but was prevented from pursuing them because the 
court determined that they were barred under the princi-
ples of Heck. Stated another way, Blair argues that he is 
entitled to equitable tolling. 
"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears 
the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has 
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Riddle v. 
Kemna, 523 F.3d 850, 857 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Walker v. Norris, 436 F3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2006))\ 
[*17] see also Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (addressing equitable tolling of a § 1983 
claim). In this case, Blair timely filed his first lawsuit on 
April 3, 2001, alleging search and seizure claims related 
to his May 12, 1997, arrest. However, his complaint was 
dismissed because the court concluded his claims were 
barred by Heck. Blair then appealed this decision, but the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed. (Case No. 4:01CV3065, Filing 
Nos. 12 and 24.) 
After his conviction was set aside, Blair filed a se-
cond lawsuit in this court realleging his Fourth Amend-
ment claims. However, because Blair had not yet been 
retried, and therefore had not obtained a final favorable 
outcome in his criminal case as contemplated by Heck, 
the court elected to stay the case. (Case No. 
4:04CV3229, Filing No. 57 at CM/ECF p. 7.) Ultimately, 
the parties and the court agreed to close the case so long 
as Blair could reopen it upon the completion of his crim-
inal proceedings in state court. (Case No. 4:04CV3229, 
Filing No. 59 at CM/ECF p. 2.) Blair has since estab-
lished that his criminal proceedings are over and his cur-
rent Complaint seeks to litigate the Fourth Amendment 
claims he first alleged in Case No. [*18] 4:01CV3065, 
and re-alleged in Case No 4:04CV3229. 
Overall, it is clear that Blair has been pursuing his 
rights diligently. In addition, the court has prevented him 
from resolving his claims as it has twice determined that 
they were barred by Heck. In light of this, the court finds 
that the statute of limitations was tolled with respect to 
Blair's Fourth Amendment claims against the Defendants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 6 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19365, * 
he sued in his first lawsuit: Housh, Truckenbrod, Chris-
tensen and Scott.3 
3 To the extent that Blair alleges his Forth 
Amendment claims against any other Defendants, 
his claims are not tolled. Blair's first case, Case 
No. 4.01CV3065, only alleged Fourth Amend-
ment claims against Housh, Truckenbrod, Chris-
tensen and Scott. (See Filing No. 4:04CV3229, 
Filing No. 31 at CM/ECF pp. 3-11.) 
2. Fourth Amendment 
Because the statute of limitations was tolled with 
respect to Blair's Fourth Amendment claims against 
Housh, Truckenbrod, Christensen and Scott, the court 
will now explore the merits of those claims. "The Fourth 
Amendment prohibits a warrantless entry of a home by 
law enforcement officers unless the circumstances are 
within a reasonableness exception to the warrant re-
quirement." US. v. Clarke, 564 F3d 949, 958-59 (8th 
Cir. 2009). [*19] However, the Eighth Circuit has rec-
ognized a "reasonableness exception to the warrant re-
quirement which allows a non-consensual, warrantless 
search of a home if the search is supported by probable 
cause and exigent circumstances." Id. at 959; see also 
United States v. Hogan, 539 F3d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 
2008). When examining if a search is reasonable, courts 
consider "all the circumstances of the particular govern-
mental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968). 
In addition, "[i]t is well established that a warrant-
less arrest without probable cause violates an individual's 
constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments." Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo., 795 
F2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir. 1986). "An officer has proba-
ble cause to arrest a suspect without a warrant if the 'facts 
and circumstances within the officer's knowledge . . . are 
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasona-
ble caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, 
that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about 
to commit an offense.'" Arnott v. Mataya, 995 F.2d 121, 
124 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 
443 US. 31, 37, 99 S. Ct 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 
(1979)). [*20] The fact that an arrested person is later 
found innocent is not material. Arnott, 995 F2dat 124. 
Here, Housh, Truckenbrod, Christensen and Scott 
did not have a warrant to arrest Blair or search his home. 
However, they argue they had probable cause because 
they relied in good faith on Dory's report that Blair had 
held her captive at gunpoint and assaulted her. (Filing 
No. 237 at CM/ECF pp. 19-20.) The record indicates that 
Dory called 911 to report these allegations on May 12, 
1997, at 6:32 p.m. (Filing No. 16; Filing No. 236-15, 
Attach. 14 at CM/ECF p. 1.) 
In contrast, Blair argues that he was arrested before 
Dory ever called 911, and therefore, the officers did not 
have probable cause to arrest him or search his home. 
(Filing No. 258 at CM/ECF pp. 8-13.) Blair uses several 
sources of evidence to support this argument. First, Blair 
submitted sworn affidavits from two individuals that 
witnessed the officers at his residence at approximately 
5;00 p.m. on May 12, 1997, and a sworn affidavit from 
his mother stating that she received a call at 5:30 on May 
12, 1997, informing her that her son had been arrested. 
(Filing No. 260 at CM/ECF pp. 4-8, 14-15.) 
Second, Blair points to the officers' [*21] police 
reports, which indicate that the original report occurred 
on May 12, 1997, between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m. and that 
Blair was booked on May 12, 1997, at 6:00 p.m. (Filing 
No. 236-3, Attach. 2 at CM/ECF pp. 6-20; Filing No. 
236-5, Attach. 4 at CM/ECF p. 6; Filing No. 236-2, At-
tach. 1 at CM/ECF p. 7.) 
Third, Blair points to the trial testimony of Housh, 
Szemplenski and Christensen. These officers all testified 
that they arrived at Blair's residence between 5:00 and 
5:45 p.m. (Filing No. 236-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 4; 
Filing No. 236-3, Attach. 2 at CM/ECF pp. 4-5; Filing 
No. 260 at CM/ECF p. 26, 36, 39.) Overall, this evidence 
supports Blair's argument that he was arrested well be-
fore Dory's 6:32 p.m. call to 911. 
The City Defendants argue that the time discrepan-
cies in the officers' reports were mistakes and.that the 
officers accidentally based their trial testimony on these 
mistakes. (Filing No. 237 at CM/ECF p. 27; Filing No. 
236-2, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 1-4; Filing No. 236-3, 
Attach. 2 at CM/ECF pp. 3-5.) Although this argument 
may have merit, a genuine issue of material fact remains 
as to whether the officers were aware of Dory's report at 
the time of Blair's arrest. The parties [*22] have pre-
sented two vastly different stories as to when Blair was 
arrested and it is not the court's place to decide who is 
telling the truth at this stage of the proceedings. See An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US. 242, 255, 106 S. 
Ct. 2505, 91L. Ed 2d 202 (1986) ("In ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment a court must not weigh evidence 
or make credibility determinations."). Viewing the facts 
in a light most favorable to Blair, a jury could find that 
he suffered a constitutional violation by being subjected 
to a search and arrest without probable cause.4 
4 There is nothing else before the court show-
ing that the officers had any other basis for prob-
able cause, or that any exigent circumstances ex-
isted to arrest Blair. 
3. Qualified Immunity 
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The City Defendants also summarily argue that they 
are entitled to qualified immunity on Blair's Fourth 
Amendment claims. (Filing No. 237 at CM/ECF pp. 
40-43.) "Because the qualified immunity privilege ex-
tends to a police officer who is wrong, so long as he is 
reasonable, the governing standard for a Fourth Amend-
ment unlawful arrest claim 'is not probable cause in fact 
but arguable probable cause . . . that is, whether the of-
ficer should have known that the arrest violated plain-
tiffs [*23] clearly established right.'" Walker v. City of 
Pine Bluff 414 F3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 
1996)). 
As discussed above, a question of fact remains as to 
whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Blair 
and search his home. In addition, the officers should 
have known that arresting Blair and searching his home 
without probable cause would violate his clearly estab-
lished rights. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 
308, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1997) (reiterat-
ing that warrantless seizures generally violate the Fourth 
Amendment absent an individualized reasonable suspi-
cion determination); Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo., 
795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir. 1986) ("It is well estab-
lished that a warrantless arrest without probable cause 
violates an individual's constitutional rights under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."). Thus, the offic-
ers are not entitled to qualified immunity on Blair's 
Fourth Amendment claims. 
C. State Law Claims 
In addition to his Fourth Amendment claims, Blab-
has alleged several state law claims against the City De-
fendants including false arrest, false imprisonment, mali-
cious prosecution, abuse of process and loss [*24] of 
consortium. As set forth below, the City Defendants are 
entitled to summary judgment on each of these claims. 
1. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious 
Prosecution and Abuse of Process 
The Nebraska Political Subdivisions Tort Claims 
Act ("NPSTCA"), Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-901 to 13-926, 
generally allows political subdivisions to be held liable 
for tort claims. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-902, 13-903(3). In 
addition, the NPSTCA is the sole method to assert a tort 
claim against a political subdivision under Nebraska law. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-902. 
However, the NPSTCA limits the types of actions 
that may be brought against a political subdivision and 
its employees in their official capacity. In particular, the 
NPSTCA does not allow a political subdivision or its 
employees to be sued "for any claims arising out of. . . 
false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, 
[or] abuse of process " Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-910(7). 
Accordingly, the court finds the NPSTCA bars Blair's 
state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious pros-
ecution and abuse of process against the City Defendants 
in their official capacities. 
Blair also asserts his false arrest, false imprison-
ment, malicious [*25] prosecution, and abuse of pro-
cess against the City Defendants in their individual ca-
pacities. Nebraska courts have consistently held that a 
political subdivision's employee cannot be sued individ-
ually if the alleged tortious conduct occurred while the 
employee acted within the scope of the employee's em-
ployment. Bohl v. Buffalo County, 251 Neb. 492, 557 
NW.2d 668, 673 (Neb. 1997); Kuchar v. Krings, 248 
Neb. 995, 540 NW.2d582, 585 (Neb. 1995); Edington v. 
City of Omaha, Nos. A-98-205 & A-98-206, 1999 Neb. 
App. LEXIS 249, 1999 WL 703294, at *4-*5 (Neb. Ct. 
App. Sept. 7, 1999). 
Here, Blair does not allege that the employees were 
acting outside the scope of their employment. In fact, 
Blair's Amended Complaint specifically states that the 
City Defendants were acting either under color of law or 
within the scope of their employment, or both. (Filing 
No. 16 at CM/ECF pp. 2-3, 6, 7.) Accordingly, Blair's 
false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution 
and abuse of process claims against the City Defendants 
in their individual capacities must also be dismissed. 
2. Loss of Consortium 
Blair also alleges that he has been deprived of the 
consortium of his family members. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 
18.) Blair is confused about his loss of consortium 
[*26] claim. In Nebraska, loss of consortium is a claim 
that accrues to an injured person's spouse and not to the 
injured person himself. Simms v. Vicorp Restaurants, 
Inc., 272 Neb. 744, 725 NW.2d 406, 409 (Neb. 2006) 
("[W]hen a married person is injured, two causes of ac-
tion arise: one accrues to the injured person for the inju-
ries suffered directly by him or her, and the other accrues 
to the injured person's spouse for damages suffered as a 
result of the loss of the injured person's services, society, 
companionship, and sexual relations (loss of consorti-
um)."). Because Blair only alleges claims against the 
City Defendants for injuries to himself, his loss of con-
sortium claim lacks merit and must be dismissed. 
D. Claims Against Skinner, Carey and the City of 
Omaha 
In addition to his Fourth Amendment and state law 
claims, Blair also alleges § 1983 claims against the City 
of Omaha and former Omaha Police Chiefs Skinner and 
Carey for failing to properly train their officers. Blair 
sues Skinner and Carey in both their individual and offi-
cial capacities. The City Defendants argue that these 
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claims should be dismissed because they are deficient. 
(Filing No. 237 at CM/ECF pp. 43-48.) The court agrees. 
1. Official [*27] Capacity Claims Against Skinner 
andCarey 
"A suit against a public official in his official capac-
ity is actually a suit against the entity for which the offi-
cial is an agent." Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 
986 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 
U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)). 
Thus, to sustain the action against Skinner and Carey in 
their official capacities, Blair must prove that the City 
"itself caused the constitutional violation at issue." Id. 
(quotation omitted). As a municipal defendant, the City 
of Omaha may only be liable under § 1983 if its "policy" 
or "custom" caused a violation of Blair's constitutional 
rights. Doe By & Through Doe v. Washington County, 
150 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Monell v. Depft 
ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S Ct. 2018, 56 L. 
Ed. 2d 611 (1978)). An "official policy" involves a de-
liberate choice to follow a course of action made from 
among various alternatives by an official who has the 
final authority to establish governmental policy. Jane 
Doe A By & Through Jane Doe B v. Special School Dist. 
of St. Louis County, 901 K2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 
106 S Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986)). 
To establish the existence of a governmental [*28] 
custom, a plaintiff must prove: 
1) The existence of a continuing, 
widespread, persistent pattern of uncon-
stitutional misconduct by the governmen-
tal entity's employees; 
2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit 
authorization of such conduct by the gov-
ernmental entity's policymaking officials 
after notice to the officials of that mis-
conduct; and 
3) That plaintiff was injured by acts 
pursuant to the governmental entity's cus-
tom, i.e., that the custom was the moving 
force behind the constitutional violation. 
Jane Doe, 901 F.2d at 646. 
Here, Blair generally alleges that Skinner and Carey 
"had a duty to properly train, supervise, and discipline" 
officers, but instead they let them "run amuck." (Filing 
No. 16 at CM/ECF p. 7.) He also alleges that Skinner 
and Carey were aware of his "unlawful arrest," but they 
refused to do anything about it. (Id.) However, Blair does 
not allege that the City of Omaha has a custom of failing 
to train, supervise or discipline its officers, nor does Blair 
allege that any custom was the moving force behind his 
injuries. Consequently, Blair has failed to properly allege 
an official capacity claim against Skinner or Carey under 
the Jane Doe standard and his official capacity [*29] 
claims against them must be dismissed. 
2. City of Omaha 
Beyond Blair's official capacity claims against 
Skinner and Carey, Blair's Amended Complaint contains 
very few allegations against the City of Omaha itself. For 
example, Blair claims that the City of Omaha "[set] his 
bond at an amount far above what the law requires" and 
is "liable for the actions of [its] officers." (Filing No. 16 
at CM/ECF pp. 6, 16.) The court finds that these allega-
tions also fail specify a City policy or custom that vio-
lated Blair's constitutional rights. Therefore, Blair's 
claims against the City of Omaha also must be dis-
missed. 
3. Individual Capacity Claims Against Skinner and 
Carey 
As discussed above, Blair also alleges his claims 
against Skinner and Carey in their individual capacities. 
The Eighth Circuit has held that a supervising officer can 
be liable for an junior officer's constitutional violation 
only "'if he directly participated in the constitutional vio-
lation, or if his failure to train or supervise the offending 
actor caused the deprivation.'" Otey v. Marshall, 121 
F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tilson v. For-
rest City Police Dep't, 28 F3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 1994)); 
see also Wever v. Lincoln County, 388 F.3d 601, 606-07 
(8th Cir. 2004). 
However, [*30] a supervising officer will not be 
individually liable for an otherwise unlawful act if he is 
entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a 
question of law to be determined by the court and should 
ordinarily be decided long before trial. Hunter v. Bryant, 
502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S. Ct. 534, 116 L. Ed 2d 589 
(1991). "Public officials, of course, are entitled to quali-
fied immunity from liability for damages under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 if 'their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.'" Domina v. Van 
Pelt, 235 F.3d 1091, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. 
Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). In short, "qualified immunity shields 
a defendant from suit if he or she could have reasonably 
believed his or her conduct to be lawful in light of clearly 
established law and the information [that the defendant] 
possessed." Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1061 
(8th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted). "The 
qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mis-
taken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incom-
petent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. (cita-
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tions and quotations omitted). Moreover, qualified im-
munity [*31] is "the usual rule" and state actors will 
enjoy qualified immunity in all but "exceptional cases." 
Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996). 
The court focuses on two questions to determine 
whether a state official is entitled to qualified immunity: 
"(1) whether, after viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party asserting the injury, there was a 
deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and, if 
so, (2) whether the right was clearly established at the 
time of the deprivation such that a reasonable official 
would understand that their conduct was unlawful . . . ." 
Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 501 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
As discussed above, Blair's allegations against 
Skinner and Carey are not based on direct participation, 
but rather relate to an alleged failure to "properly train, 
supervise, and discipline" officers. (Filing No. 16 at 
CM/ECF p. 7.) However, "a supervisory officer is enti-
tled to qualified immunity for a § 1983 failure to train 
action unless a reasonable supervisor would have known 
that his training program (or lack thereof) was likely to 
result in the specific constitutional violation at issue." 
Parrish v. Ball, Nos. 08-3517, 08-3518, 594 F3d 993, 
2010 US. App. LEXIS 2748, 2010 WL 445736, at *8 (8th 
Cir. Feb. 10, 2010); [*32] see also Gold v. City of Mi-
ami, 121 F3d 1442, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that a 
supervisor is entitled to qualified immunity unless "a 
reasonable person in the supervisor's position would have 
known that his conduct infringed the constitutional rights 
of the plaintiff and his conduct was causally related to 
the constitutional violation committed by his subordi-
nate" (quotation omitted)). 
Even when the record is viewed in a light most fa-
vorable to Blair, it does not suggest that Skinner or Carey 
would have known that their training programs and poli-
cies would likely result in Blair's alleged constitutional 
violations. In fact, the record indicates that the OPD's 
training program includes "intensive" training on the 
"investigation of crimes, preparation of reports, . . . han-
dling of witnesses and evidence, . . . legal limits on po-
lice activities,. . . testimony in court and . . . necessity to 
be truthful and accurate." (Filing No. 238-2, Attach. 1 at 
CM/ECF pp. 1-2.) Blair has presented no evidence to 
show that this training program or OPD's policies are 
inadequate. In light of these findings, Skinner and Carey 
are entitled to qualified immunity for Blair's claims 
against them in [*33] their individual capacities. 
E. Conspiracy Claims 
Last, Blair alleges Osier and Morgan conspired with 
other state actors to violate his rights. Blair brings these 
conspiracy claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 
1985. 
In order to establish a conspiracy claim under 42 
U.S.C § 1983, Blair must prove "that the defendant 
conspired with others to deprive him or her of a constitu-
tional right; that at least one of the alleged 
co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of 
the conspiracy; and that the overt act injured the plain-
tiff." Askew v. Millerd, 191 F3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 
1999). In order to establish a conspiracy claim under 42 
U.S.C § 1985, Blair must prove: (1) the defendants con-
spired, (2) with the intent to deprive him of a constitu-
tional right, (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
and (4) an injury to his person or property, or a depriva-
tion of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United 
States. Barstad v. Murray County, 420 F.3d 880, 887 
(8th Cir. 2005). 
"A conspiracy claim requires evidence of specific 
facts that show a 'meeting of minds1 among conspira-
tors." Id. (quoting Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 
856 (8th Cir. 1988)). Because a corporation [*34] and 
its agents are a single entity in the eyes of the law, a 
corporation cannot conspire with itself. Cross v. General 
Motors Corp., 721 F2d 1152, 1156 (8th Cir. 1983). The 
Eighth Circuit has extended this concept to government 
entities. See Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 
354 (8th Cir. 1985); Richmond v. Bd. of Regents, 957 
F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1992). However, an exception 
arises where individual defendants "act outside the scope 
of their employment for personal reasons." Garza v. City 
of Omaha, 814 F.2d553, 556 (8th Cir. 1987). 
Here, Blair alleges Osier conspired with "other state 
actors" to manufacture false evidence and Morgan con-
spired "with other state actors" to testify falsely.5 (Filing 
No. 16 at CM/ECF pp. 12-16.) Blair does not identify 
who the "other state actors" are, nor does he allege that 
Osier and Morgan were acting outside of the scope of 
their employment. Rather, Blair alleges that Osier and 
Morgan acted under color of law at all times. (Id. at 
CM/ECF p. 3.) Moreover, Blair's Amended Complaint 
and Brief are replete with speculation and conclusory 
statements regarding a conspiracy, but nowhere does he 
allege any facts to establish the necessary "meeting 
[*35] of the minds" between these Defendants and a 
person not employed by the City of Omaha. Because 
Blair's evidence and claims show only that the alleged 
conspirators were employed by the same entity, and be-
cause there is no allegation or reason to believe that the 
alleged conspirators were acting outside the scope of 
their employment, Blair cannot establish the existence of 
a conspiracy-a single entity cannot conspire with itself. 
In light of these findings, the court finds that Osier and 
Morgan are entitled to summary judgment on Blair's 
conspiracy claims. 
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5 Blair also alleges Paul Koltz ("Koltz") con-
spired to manufacture false evidence. (Filing No. 
16 at CM/ECF p. 12.) However, because Blair 
failed to serve Koltz, Blair's claims against Koltz 
were dismissed on April 10, 2009. (Filing No. 
167.) 
In sum, the City Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Blair's 
only remaining claims are his Fourth Amendment Claims 
against Housh, Truckenbrod, Scott and Christensen. The 
court will enter a separate progression order progressing 
this matter to trial. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 
1. The City Defendants' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment (filing no. 235) is granted [*36] in part and denied 
in part. 
2. Blair's Claims against Patricia Osier, Jeffrey 
Morgan, Lawrence Reynard, Morgan Larson, James 
Skinner, Donald Carey, City of Omaha, and Randy 
Szemplenski are dismissed with prejudice. 
3. A separate order will be entered progressing this 
matter to trial. 
DATED this 3rd day of March, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
I si Joseph F. Bataillon 
Chief United States District Judge 
* This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other 
documents or Web sites. The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, ap-
prove, or guarantee any third parties or the services or 
products they provide on their Web sites. Likewise, the 
court has no agreements with any of these third parties or 
their Web sites. The court accepts no responsibility for 
the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, 
the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user 
to some other site does not affect the opinion of the 
court. 
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